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Abstract 
This research develops a quantitative analysis aimed at simulating the trade effects of various 
integration scenarios between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners (MPs). Results for shallow 
integration show that the completion of tariff removal is expected to produce limited gains, except in 
Algeria. However, further steps toward deep integration would lead to much more significant gains. In 
this regard, the elimination of non-tariff barriers is expected to increase EU exports to MPs up to 60%. 
In addition, MPs’ imports and exports to the EU could also considerably increase due to an 
improvement of logistics performance in these countries. 
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Introduction 
This paper aims to pave the way for an assessment of the specific impact of shallow versus deep 
integration between Mediterranean (MED) countries1 and their partners in the European Union (EU), 
and between the MED countries themselves. It relies on a dataset developed for this project (Annex 3), 
especially concerning tariffs (as a proxy for shallow integration) and Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs)2 
(as a proxy for deep integration). Additional data are included to take into account other trade costs, 
especially transport and logistics costs. In this regard, an original dataset of maritime freight cost 
(Maersk, 2007) and the logistics performance index (LPI) produced by the World Bank will be 
introduced. Such datasets are useful in providing additional insight into deep integration. 
Section 1 of Part I is dedicated to calculating the magnitude of NTMs in terms of ad valorem tariff 
equivalent (AVEs). It relies on new research developments based on Kee et al. (2009). This allows us 
to gain initial insight into the role of NTMs in Mediterranean trade and thus the cost of non-deep 
integration. 
Section 2 of Part I estimates a gravity model from new theoretical and empirical developments. This 
model relies heavily on trade costs, following the literature of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). 
Consequently, implementing the gravity model makes it possible to calculate the specific impact of 
tariffs, NTMs and transport and logistics costs on the trade of Mediterranean countries with their 
partners in the EU. This provides a better understanding of the expected gains due to these cost 
reductions in the framework of shallow and deep integration. These results pave the way for 
simulations of trade creation due to shallow and deep integration, which are carried out in Part II of 
the study. The simulations differentiate between shallow and deep integration. Trade creation is 
calculated in both cases between the MED countries on the one hand and the EU countries on the 
other, as well as amongst the MED countries. Conclusions and policy implications follow.  
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1 MED countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian 
territories, and Israel. Libya and Palestinian territories have not been included in this analysis because of data 
unavailability. 
2 The term “Non-Tariff Measures” (NTMs) has recently gained acceptance. It now tends to replace the term 
“Non-Tariff Barriers” (NTBs) since some measures do not always intend to be explicitly protectionist (e.g. some 
regulations or standards designed at increasing consumer safety (Cadot et al., 2011). 
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Part I. Preliminary Evidence from a Gravity Model with Trade Costs 
1. An estimation of tariff and NTMs protection between the south Mediterranean 
and the EU 
This section attempts to provide an estimation of trade costs, especially tariffs and NTMs applied 
between MED-11 and the EU (a review of the NTMs prevailing in MED countries is provided in 
Annex 1). This will make it possible to i) have a better understanding of the level and magnitude of 
tariffs and NTMs in the countries considered; ii) use these estimations as inputs into the gravity model 
in order to assess the effects of tariffs and NTMs in MED-11/EU trade. 
Starting with tariffs, where the database developed in this project (see Annex 3) provides bilateral 
tariffs at digit-2 level between MED countries and the EU. Figure 1 summarises MFN tariffs applied 
by MED countries. 
Figure 1. Average MFN tariffs applied by MED countries (unweighted average, %)* 
 
*Note: last year available in brackets. 
(Libya and Palestine are excluded due to lack of data). 
Source: Lopez Gonzalez & Mendez Parra (2010). 
It shows that with the exception of Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, other countries still show significant 
tariff protection, especially Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria. 
Table 1 complements these results by showing the average tariffs that are effectively applied overall 
and at the bilateral level. It provides a slightly different picture by showing that Israel and Turkey have 
removed almost all tariff protection with regard to EU imports. Morocco and Lebanon have also made 
significant progress, with small average tariffs applied to EU imports. On the other hand, Tunisia, 
Syria and Algeria show the highest tariffs (up to 18% for Tunisia), whereas Jordan and Egypt are in an 
intermediate position. It is difficult to understand why Tunisia shows such a high level of tariffs with 
regards to EU imports, however, since this country signed an Association Agreement including a free 
trade area very early with the EU, in 1995, and started dismantling tariffs somewhat earlier than other 
South Mediterranean countries that signed similar agreements with the EU. Whatever the reliability of 
the data, Table 1 shows that the shallow integration process is not fully complete between MED 
countries and the EU, with the exception of Israel and Turkey. In particular, Algeria and to a lesser 
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extent Tunisia, exhibit relatively high tariffs. This remark will have significant implications when 
assessing the impact of shallow versus deep integration using a gravity model.3 
Table 1. Average tariffs applied by MED countries on their imports (%, unweighted average) 
 
Source: TRAINS; De Wulf & Maliszewska (eds) (2009); n.a. non available. 
With regard to the tariffs applied to MED countries’ exports by the partners considered in this study 
(i.e. all countries in the Euro-Mediterranean area), we should recall that they have been progressively 
removed, both in the framework of the Barcelona process and in the framework of the South-South 
integration process (GAFTA agreement). As a result, the shallow integration is now complete as far as 
MED countries’ exports are concerned. Algeria is an exception since it is a GAFTA member but did 
not start the tariff liberalisation process in 2005 (Péridy & Ghoneim, 2009). Israel and Turkey are two 
other exceptions, since these two countries are outside the GAFTA area. 
The estimation of NTMs is a more difficult task. As explained in Annex 3, the corresponding data are 
from the TRAINS database, with eight groups of measures, including specific charges and taxes, 
administered process, financial measures, automatic licenses, non-automatic licenses and other 
quantitative restrictions, monopolistic measures as well as technical or quality regulations (for a 
complete description, refer to Annex 3). One drawback with this dataset is that data are incomplete 
and available for one year only (generally 1999 or 2001). Nevertheless, it provides a first insight into 
NTMs in MED countries. Another drawback is that the available data do not indicate the number of 
NTMs applied at the bilateral level. Consequently, it does not provide any direct indication about the 
effectiveness of NTMs as a protection tool. In particular, it is not possible to compare the magnitude 
of the protection due to NTMs to that due to tariffs, since these two variables are not measured in the 
same way. However, this significant problem can be solved by calculating tariff ad valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs. This can be achieved by using the recent methodology developed by 
Kee et al. (2009), which is sometimes referred to as KNO (2009). 
The KNO methodology can be applied here in two stages. The first includes an estimation of the 
quantity impact of NTMs on imports. This impact is then transformed into price effects, using import 
demand elasticities calculated in Kee et al. (2008). 
 
 
                                                     
3 It should be noted that MFN and applied tariffs are not strictly comparable, due to aggregation biases. For 
example, TRAINS reports an applied tariff equal to 0 if there is no trade between Mediterranean countries and 
the EU for a given product. This of course introduces a bias since tariffs for this product are not necessarily equal 
to zero. As a result, this product must be removed if we wish to calculate average tariffs (weighted or 
unweighted) without this bias. Then, as products are aggregated into digit 2, MFN tariffs are not strictly 
comparable to applied ones since the product coverage is not exactly the same. 
Tariffs with Tariffs Share of Duty 
all countries with EU free EU lines
Algeria (2009) 14.1 12.9 n.a.
Morocco (2009) 8.2 3.9 51.0
Tunisia (2006) 22.2 18.0 39.2
Egypt (2008) 9.4 10.1 6.2
Lebanon (2007) 5.1 5.4 n.a.
Israel (2008) 2.1 0.1 95.0
Jordan (2007) 10.1 11,0 38.3
Syria (2002) 12.8 14.1 n.a.
Turkey (2009) 1.2 0.1 n.a.
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In the first stage, the basic equation to be estimated is the following: 
( ) cncncn
k
cn
ntb
cn
k
cknncn tntmCm ,,,,,,, 1log)log( μεβαα +++++= ∑  (1.1) 
Where mn,c is the import value of good (or industry) n in country c (MED countries) from EU 
countries (i), Ckc denotes a vector of country characteristics variables in MED countries. They include 
relative factor endowment4 and the sum of GDP (of the reporter and the partner country) which 
captures economic size. The geographic distance between MED countries and their Mediterranean 
partners is also included. ntmn,c is a dummy variable which reflects the existence of bilateral NTMs. 
tn,cis the bilateral tariff on good n in country c (for imports from the EU) and εν,χ corresponds to the 
import demand elasticity.  
Using the dataset completed by Lopez Gonzalez and Mendez Parra (2010) (Annex 3), several proxies 
are available for tariffs, namely MFN, PREF (preferential) and AHS (effectively applied tariffs), 
which is the minimum between MFN and PREF. As a sensitivity analysis, all proxies have been 
tested. However, since preferential tariff data are often unavailable,5 this introduces two problems. The 
first is that it significantly increases the number of unavailable observations. Second, it introduces a 
bias in AHS measure. As a matter of fact, the measure of AHS will be correct when the preferential 
tariff is available, but when it is not, the AHS tariff takes the value of the MFN one (since in the 
formula, the minimum between MFN and unavailable PREF becomes MFN). Consequently, the 
measure of the AHS is very volatile in time since it sometimes captures MFN only. Given these 
problems, the MFN tariff seems to be the most reliable measure for the calculation of AVEs. 
Therefore, the results presented later include only MFN tariffs. 
In the same way, several proxies are available for NTMs. As noticed earlier, eight groups of measures 
are available. For simplicity, we aggregate all these NTM types (except the first category, which 
includes tariffs). In addition, a distinction is also made according to which the products and/or 
countries the NTM applies. Indeed, some NTMs apply regardless of the origin (e.g. sanitary 
requirement), some others regardless of the product, whereas some others are product-specific or 
country-specific. In order to capture the full range of NTMs, the latter have also been aggregated, 
including country and product-specific NTMs as well as country and product non-specific NTMs. As a 
final step, this NTM variable is transformed into a binary variable which takes the value of zero in 
case of no NTM and unity if there is at least one NTM. This transformation is necessary to fit the 
model described in equation (1.1).6 However, when testing the trade impact of NTMs in section 3, we 
will no longer use a dummy variable. 
The initial model is subsequently modified as follows. First, import-demand elasticities estimated in 
Kee et al. (2008) are substituted into (1.1). Second, the tariff term is moved to the left-hand side to 
address the endogeneity of tariffs. This introduces a new error term kn,c. Third, a White correction is 
introduced in order to tackle heterosckedasticity of the error term. Fourth, product specific effects are 
also introduced so as to capture the variation of βσ across tariff lines. Fifth, appropriate instrumental 
variables are included to address the endogeneity problem related to NTMs. Indeed, as shown in Lee 
and Swagel (1997), such endogeneity may lead to a downward bias for the estimated impact of NTMs 
                                                     
4 Factor endowment is measured by a proxy that is the difference in GDP per capita between the reporter and the 
partner country. As a sensitivity analysis, calculations have also been implemented with the proxy developed by 
Antweiler and Trefler (2002), but the results are less relevant in this case. 
5 This may be because of zero flows or because data are unavailable for a given product in a given country. 
6 Some other proxies have also been tested as a sensitivity analysis. The first is a variable which only includes 
product and country-specific NTMs, given that when NTMs apply to all products and countries, there is no 
longer discrimination across products and countries. As a second proxy, we use the total number of NTMs 
applying for each product and each country.  
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on imports, which would result in underestimating AVEs. Sixth, a two-step estimation procedure is 
implemented to estimate the β coefficients, following a Heckman two-stage procedure.7 
After these transformations, the final estimated equation becomes: 
( ) cn
k
cn
C
k
cknncncncn ntmeCtm k
k
c
ntb
cn
ntb
cn
,,,,,,
,,
1log)log( κααε ββ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∑−++=+− ∑ +  (1.2) 
The left hand side of this equation reflects the value of imports once tariffs have been taken into 
account. This value of imports depends on country characteristics and on the remaining barriers to 
trade, i.e. NTMs.  
Estimating equation (1.2) with the two-step Heckman procedure (TSHP) relies on the following 
assumption. The basic idea is that zero trade flows in the dataset do not occur randomly but are the 
outcome of a selection procedure. As a result, the TSHP estimator makes it possible to correct for this 
selection bias. The first stage estimates a Probit model (test for the probability of country i to exports 
to country j). In a second stage, when exports occur, the effects of trade barriers and other variables 
can be estimated through the choice of an appropriate estimator (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2006).  
Basically, various selection variables have been tested. The final specification assumes that the 
likelihood to export depends on the type of partner countries. Indeed, the partner countries are 
classified into four groups according to the probability to export, which depends notably on political 
barriers. The four groups include the EU-15, other Mediterranean partners, other EU countries, and 
Israel. It is expected that the probability for Mediterranean countries to export is greater towards the 
EU-15 than towards other countries, especially Israel, for political reasons. As a sensitivity analysis, it 
is assumed that the probability to export depends on the occurrence of exports in the past period. 
Indeed, according to the new trade theory developed by Baldwin and Krugman (1989), a firm must 
bear sunk costs before entering the export market. As a result, a firm’s probability to export depends 
on its ability to export in the past period. This theory is based on hysteresis in international trade. 
The last step consists of calculating the AVEs after the transformation of the quantity impact derived 
from equation 1.2 into price-equivalents. This leads to: 
NTM
PAVE
d
∂
∂= log  (1.3) 
Where Pd denotes the domestic price. This equation defines AVEs as the effects of NTMs on prices.  
The introduction of the price variable is necessary since, like ad-valorem tariffs, NTM effects must be 
calculated on prices and not on quantities. After differentiation of equation (1.1), it is easy to obtain: 
cn
ntb
cn
ntb
cneAVE
,
,
1,
ε
β −=  (1.4) 
Results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2 (except for Israel, Turkey and Syria, for which data on 
NTMs are unavailable). The estimation of the TSHP shows that the presence of NTMs (i.e. when the 
NTM dummy is equal to unity) has a negative and significant impact on the dependent variable 
(imports nets of tariffs) in Mediterranean countries. However, there are significant differences across 
countries. As a matter of fact, Algeria is the country that faces the greater coefficient related to NTMs 
(-0.83). Conversely, Morocco and Tunisia exhibit the lowest coefficient in absolute value (-0.33 and 
-0.38 respectively). Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt are ranked in an intermediate position.8 
                                                     
7 For additional details, refer to Kee et al. (2009) p. 177. 
8At this stage, it is worth noting that the reliability of the calculation of these coefficients is limited by the 
restricted quality of the data concerning NTMs. As a matter of fact, results can be sensitive to the way the NTMs 
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Looking at the other independent variables, the GDP per capita ratio is positive and generally 
significant. This means that as the economic distance (measured by the gap in GDP per capita) 
increases between Mediterranean countries and their partners, trade also increases. This also suggests 
that most trade patterns between Mediterranean countries and their partners involve inter-industry 
trade. The sum of GDP between Mediterranean countries and their partners also show a positive and 
significant sign, as expected theoretically. Indeed, trade is expected to increase with the size of the two 
partners. Interestingly, the sign of the selection variable is negative and significant. This means that 
the likelihood to trade depends on the type of partner countries (EU, other Mediterranean countries or 
Israel). 
Table 2. Parameter estimates used to calculate AVEs (from the two-step Heckman Procedure (TSHP)) 
Dependent variable: imports net of tariffs (see equation 1.2) 
 
*** significant at 1%-level; ** significant at 5%-level; * significant at 10%-level;  
Source: own calculations. Import demand elasticities from Kee et al. (2008). 
The results presented in Table 2 are used to calculate AVEs according to equation (1.4). The lower the 
parameter estimate corresponding to NTMs and the lower the import demand elasticity (in absolute 
value), the higher the AVE. The other variables are not directly introduced for the calculation of the 
AVE but they are necessary in the model to make sure that the NTM parameter estimate is not biased 
by omitted variables. 
The calculations of the corresponding AVEs are reported in Figure 2. They provide a first picture 
about the magnitude of NTMs. In this regard, it can be observed that protection due to NTMs is very 
significant for Algeria but also for Jordan (due to low import demand elasticity in absolute value).9 In 
these two countries, NTMs amount to more than 33% in tariff equivalent. It is striking to observe that 
these countries also show the highest number of NTMs in the database, up to 309,800 for Jordan). 
Conversely, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt (due to high import demand elasticity in absolute value) 
exhibit the lowest AVEs (less than 25%). Interestingly, these countries show the lowest number of 
NTMs in the database (about 20000 each). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
are measured. The final specification presents average results, where all NTMs are taken into account (country-
specific, product-specific as well as NTMs applied to products regardless of their origin). Results are also limited 
by the restricted availability of the data for NTMs (only available for the year 1999 or 2001 and even unavailable 
for Turkey and Israel) or for trade and tariffs at product level. 
9 The import demand elasticity is equal to -1.16 in Jordan whereas it is -1.78 for Egypt. This explains that 
although these two countries exhibit similar parameter estimates, the AVE is greater for Jordan according to 
equation (1.4). 
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia
independent:
ntb ‐0.836*** ‐0.501*** ‐0.489*** ‐0.431*** ‐0.387*** ‐0.335***
gdpcap 0.129** 0.145* 0.795*** ‐0.070 1.191*** 0.118
distance ‐0.0004*** ‐0.0001** ‐0.0001** ‐0.0004*** ‐0.0008*** ‐0.0010***
sum gdp 0.939*** 1.28*** 1.060*** 1.16*** 1.59*** 1.48***
constant 6.249*** 4.878*** 4.725*** 6.583*** 6.911*** 8.165***
selection:
partner type ‐0,334** ‐0.511** ‐0.489** ‐0.476** ‐0.541** ‐0.414**
nb obs. 1727 2039 1618 2002 1821 1985
censored obs 341 815 286 396 428 455
import demand elasticities ‐1.59 ‐1.78 ‐1.16 ‐1.26 ‐1.45 ‐1.24
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Figure 2. An estimation of AVEs in Mediterranean countries (%) 
 
Source: own calculation. 
By adding tariffs and NTMs, the overall protection is presented in Figure 3. It is worth mentioning that 
all Mediterranean countries exhibit NTMs that are greater than tariffs. Overall, Algeria and Jordan, but 
also Tunisia (due to significant tariffs) show protection levels which range between 43% (Jordan) and 
50% (Algeria). In the other countries, protection is also significant, but to a lesser extent (about 30% in 
Morocco, Egypt and Lebanon). Of course, adding tariffs and NTMs together provide levels of 
protection that are not fully reliable, as a quota might be binding and hence no tariff-equivalent effect 
will be shown. In other words, the impact is not necessarily cumulative. Nevertheless, Figure 3 
provides an illustrative picture of overall protection in Mediterranean countries. 
In brief, whatever the method implemented and the quality of the data used for the calculation, it 
seems that the overall rate of protection remains significant in Mediterranean countries, especially due 
to great NTMs. This has been confirmed by a recent World Bank report on MENA countries, which 
identified that NTMs remain a significant barrier to enhancing trade in general and exports in specific 
in this region (World Bank, 2011b). 
Figure 3. Overall protection in Mediterranean countries: tariffs and NTMs (%) 
  
Source: own calculation. 
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Given these high protection levels, it is expected that the trade impact of both tariffs and NTMs on 
Mediterranean imports from their partners will be significant. The story is somehow different when 
looking at Mediterranean exports to their partners. In this regard, it must be observed that since the 
early 90s the EU has fully removed its tariff protection applied to these countries. In addition, the 
NTMs applied by the EU also seem to be of lower importance. For example, Kee et al. (2009) shows 
that the AVE applied by the EU to its imports is equal to 13.4%. This is much lower that AVEs 
applied by Mediterranean countries to their own imports. Consequently, the NTM removal between 
the EU and Mediterranean countries is expected to produce smaller effects with regard to 
Mediterranean exports than Mediterranean imports from the EU. This question will be investigated in 
the following section. 
2. The application of a specific gravity model with trade costs 
2.1 Theoretical underpinning  
The following gravity model can be implemented to provide a first glimpse into the impact of shallow 
versus deep integration. From a theoretical point of view, the gravity equation has been considerably 
renewed in recent years. Indeed, it has been increasingly recognised that this equation can be derived 
from various international trade theories, notably Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and monopolistic 
competition models (Helpman & Krugman, 1985; Bergstrand, 1989; Markusen & Wigle, 1990; 
Evenett & Keller, 2002), but also the reciprocal-dumping model (Feenstra, Markusen & Rose, 2001). 
The gravity equation proposed here is based on this renewal. It starts from a modified version of the 
theoretical equation developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003 and 2004), with special emphasis 
on trade costs, which are the crucial point in our research study: 
σ
μ
γα −
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
jtit
ijt
wt
jtit
ijt PP
T
Y
YY
X  (1.5) 
Xijt corresponds to country i’s exports to country j at year t. The first term in brackets includes the mass 
variables, namely country i’s GDP (Yit), country j’s GDP (Yjt) as well as world GDP (Ywt). The second 
term in brackets reflects trade costs. They include the bilateral trade cost (Tijt) as well as implicit prices 
(Pit and Pjt) which measure multilateral trade costs (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003). 
In the same way, implicit prices can be written as:10 
( ) jtPP
i
ijtititjt ∀= ∑ −−− ,111 σσσ θ  (1.6) 
( ) itPP
j
ijtjtjtit ∀= ∑ −−− ,111 σσσ θ  (1.7) 
With θi and θj denoting country i and j's income shares.  
Since prices depend on the trade barriers applied to all countries, they reflect multilateral trade 
resistance, i.e. the trade barriers that an exporter faces with all importing countries, not only its 
bilateral partner j. As a result, a rise in the trade costs vis-à-vis all its partners leads country i to trade 
more with its bilateral partner j. 
                                                     
10 See Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) for the complete derivation of the model. 
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2.2 Model specification, data and sources 
This theoretical framework makes it possible to derive the following empirical equation which will be 
tested for the Mediterranean countries’ trade relationships: 
jijkjkjjk TRANSCOSTNTMsTARSUMGDPX lnlnlnln 43210 ααααα ++++=  
ijtkjjj COLLANG εϕφαα +++++ lnln 65  (1.8) 
Given that data for NTMs are only available for one year (generally 2001), the gravity equation, will 
only be estimated for this year. This is why the temporal pattern of the equation is disregarded. In 
addition, the equation is estimated for each Mediterranean country i. As a result, the equation does not 
include the GDP of the origin and destination country separately, but the sum of the GDP (SUMGDP) 
of each Mediterranean country with its partner j.11 This particular specification is frequently used both 
in the theoretical and the empirical literature based on the new trade theory (NTT) (Helpman & 
Krugman, 1985). Finally, subscript k denotes the product decomposition level (digit 2). 
Interestingly, bilateral trade costs are considered with three variables. The first corresponds to bilateral 
tariffs (TARj). This variable will be used as a proxy for the shallow integration whose process has 
been initiated in the Barcelona Process and its related Association Agreements. As in section 1, the 
MFN tariffs have been used for the estimation of the model, given the possible biases related to the 
use of the AHS tariffs. Data are derived from the UNCTAD TRAINS database (see Annex 3 for 
complete description of these variables). 
NTMs will be considered as a proxy for deep integration. We will use the same proxy as in section 1, 
i.e. a binary variable which takes the value of unity in case of NTMs and 0 otherwise.  
TRANSCOST is an original measure of transportation costs. It is based on statistics developed by 
Maersk, which is one of the leading shipping liner companies in the world. It must also be 
remembered that maritime transport accounts for about 80% of world trade. The variable used in the 
model corresponds to the freight costs in US$ for a standard container (20 foot long) from a port of 
origin to a port of destination (year 2007). Table 3 shows some freight costs for a selection of 
importing (mport) and exporting (xport) ports 
  
                                                     
11 As in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), world GDP is passed on to the intercept α0. 
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Table 3. Freight costs for a selection of countries in the Euro-Mediterranean area (US$ for a standard 
container, 2007) 
 
Source: Maersk Line (2007).  
Since data are not available for all reporter and partner countries, missing data have been simulated 
from the following panel data model: 
ijtijjiij DISTTRANSCOST ελγγα ++++= lnln 0  (1.9) 
In equation (1.9), the relationship between freight costs (TRANSCOST) and distance is estimated with 
available data. A fixed-effects model is implemented with γi and γj as country-specific effects. Results 
show that a0=1292.8 and γ=0.071 which is significant at 5% level. 
In a second step, freight costs can be simulated for the missing importing or exporting countries by the 
use of the estimated results (including the estimated fixed effects). 
As a sensitivity analysis, alternative variables are also used for transport costs. The most interesting 
one is related to the logistics performance index (LPI) (World Bank, 2011a). This indicator is built 
from information gathered in a worldwide survey of the companies involved in logistics services. 
Seven areas are covered by this index, namely: efficiency of the clearance process by customs and 
other border agencies, quality of transport and information technology infrastructure for logistics, ease 
of arranging international shipments, competence of the local logistics industry, ability to trace and 
check international shipments, domestic logistics costs as well as timeliness of shipments in reaching 
their destination. The LPI is a weighted average of these variables. It ranges between 1 (worst) to 5 
(best). Overall, the LPI is particularly relevant for our study since it measures not only transport costs, 
but more generally the efficiency of logistics in a given country. It is expected that countries with the 
best LPI score trade more than other countries (everything being equal). 
Figures 4a and 4b show respectively the score and country ranking of for the countries included in the 
present study. The most striking feature is the gap between the EU and MENA countries. As a matter 
of fact, 11 EU countries are ranked in the world top-20 countries. In particular, Germany, Sweden and 
the Netherlands are respectively ranked in first, second and fourth place in the world for their logistics 
performance (Singapore is in second place). These three EU countries are major global transport and 
mport xport freight mport xport freight
Algeria France 1872.62 Morocco France 1431.07
Algeria Germany 1914.56 Morocco Germany 1439.73
Algeria Italy 1709.09 Morocco Italy 1515.2
Algeria Netherlands 1858.3 Morocco Netherlands 1350.19
Algeria Spain 1940.52 Morocco Spain 1265.98
Algeria UK 1906.98 Morocco UK 1552.95
Egypt France 1574.17 Tunisia France 1394.65
Egypt Germany 1216.68 Tunisia Germany 1436.59
Egypt Italy 859.46 Tunisia Italy 879.65
Egypt Netherlands 1160.43 Tunisia Netherlands 1252.19
Egypt Spain 1409.07 Tunisia Spain 1296.13
Egypt UK 1348.61 Tunisia UK 1464.54
Israel France 1639.68 Turkey France 1521.23
Israel Germany 1281.62 Turkey Germany 1363.46
Israel Italy 1277.46 Turkey Italy 1473.55
Israel Netherlands 1225.37 Turkey Netherlands 1307.2
Israel Spain 1430.59 Turkey Spain 1422.7
Israel UK 1273 Turkey UK 1442.4
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logistics hubs, which are very efficient. These countries are followed by most northern EU countries. 
On the other hand, MED countries are ranked well behind, except Israel, Lebanon and Turkey (ranked 
31, 33 and 39 respectively) which are close to southern and eastern EU countries. 
In particular, Algeria and Libya are placed at the bottom of the country ranking (respectively 130 and 
132). This reveals major transport and logistics inefficiency problems in these two countries. Syria, 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco also show poor results in terms of LPI. However, Tunisia, ranking at 61, 
shows significant progress. In this regard, the World Bank (2007) noted that the difference in country 
ranking between Tunisia and Morocco may be explained by the fact that Tunisia has implemented the 
core reforms earlier than Morocco and has just reaped the benefits of these reforms. Nevertheless, 
Morocco has recently implemented exemplary customs and port reforms which should significantly 
improve its ranking in the coming years. It must also be noticed that data for 2010 are unavailable for 
Morocco. 
Although the LPI is a very interesting indicator, its relevance for the present study is limited by the 
fact that data are provided at country level, not at bilateral level. In addition, since the estimation of 
the model is implemented for each MED country, it is not possible to test the impact of each MED 
country’s logistics efficiency on their imports. Given this limitation, two alternative solutions are 
proposed. The first consists of testing the impact of partner’s LPI on MENA countries’ imports. In this 
case, the estimation results will reflect to what extent the logistics efficiency of MED’s partners 
(mainly EU countries) increases the imports from these partners. A second possibility consists of 
testing the LPI impact on all (not each) MED countries’ exports, in order to increase the number of 
available observations. 
Figure 4a. The Logistics Performance Index in the Euromed area (scores, 2010*) 
 
*year 2007 concerning Morocco. 
Source: World Bank (2011a). 
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Figure 4b. Country ranking for LPI (rank 2010* over 155 countries) 
 
*year 2007 concerning Morocco. 
Source: World Bank (2011a). 
As a last alternative proxy for transport costs, the distance between MED countries and their EU 
partners will also be used. It is measured by a weighted index which takes into account the spatial 
distribution of the population within each country (CEPII, 2007a). 
LANGij is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a common language is spoken by at least 
10% of the population in each country pair (exporter and importer) and 0 otherwise (source: CEPII, 
2007b). 
COLij reflects colonial relationships over a long period of time with substantial participation in the 
colonised country’s governance (CEPII, 2007b). This variable is equal to 1 in case of colonial links 
and 0 otherwise. This variable accounts for cultural and historical relationships that are expected to 
increase trade flows between some EU countries and Mediterranean countries. 
Finally, specific country and product effects are introduced in the model (φj and ϕk). These effects 
make it possible to capture the heterogeneity of the data. They also capture the effects of potential 
omitted variables (Egger, 2004). In particular, the price effects included in equation (1.5) are captured 
by the country-specific effect(φj).12 In addition, the product effect ϕk takes into account potential 
omitted variables at product level. All these specific effects can be considered as fixed or random 
depending on the specification of the model. 
                                                     
12 As there are no reliable cross-country price indicators, the use of the country-specific effects is the most 
commonly used in the empirical literature since Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). 
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2.3 Choice of the estimators and sensitivity analysis 
The estimation of equation (1.8) requires specific econometric analysis in order to address several 
potential biases. The first bias to be considered is heterogeneity across countries and products. It 
requires the use of fixed-effects (FE) or random effects (RE) estimators. However, the problem with 
standard FE models is that they cannot estimate parameters that are product invariant, such as freight 
costs, language and colonisation in equation (1.9). On the other hand, the standard RE model may be 
biased because of endogeneity problems due to the potential correlation between one or several 
independent variables and the residuals. 
One recent and interesting estimator can be used to address these problems. This is the fixed-effects 
vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007). This three stage 
fixed-effects model can estimate the parameters of the product invariant variables while addressing the 
endogeneity problem. Basically, the first stage estimates a pure fixed effects model to obtain an 
estimate of the unit effects. The second step implements an instrumental regression of the fixed effects 
vector on the product invariant variables. This makes it possible to decompose the fixed effects vector 
into a first component explained by the product-invariant variables and a second component, namely 
the inexplicable part (the error term). In the last stage, the model is re-estimated by pooled OLS, 
including all explanatory variables, the product-invariant variables and the error term. This third step 
ensures the control for collinearity between product-varying and invariant right hand side variables.  
As a sensitivity analysis, another estimator corrected for endogeneity is presented. It is based on a 
random-effects estimator with instrumental variables, namely the Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimator, 
described in Egger (2004).  
An additional potential bias is due to zero observations. This problem is potentially important since the 
database includes bilateral and disaggregated trade flows (by industries at digit-2). This problem can 
be addressed by several alternative methods. The first consists of transforming all trade values in non 
zero flows, as follows: 
)1ln(ln ' += jkjk XX  (1.10) 
This method is commonly used in the empirical literature. However, it does not specifically address 
the question of why some firms export while others don’t (selection bias). A second possible estimator 
is the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). This estimator 
makes is possible to simultaneously solve the bias due to missing zero flows and heteroskedasticity. 
However, it does not address the selection bias due to zero observations. 
A third interesting method is the Two-Stage Heckman Procedure (TSHP). As shown previously, the 
basic idea is that zero trade flows in the dataset do not occur randomly but are the outcome of a 
selection procedure. As a result, the TSHP estimator provides a correction for this selection bias. The 
first stage estimates a Probit model (test for the probability of country i to exports to country j). In a 
second stage, provided that exports occur, the effects of trade barriers and other variables can be 
estimated though the choice of an appropriate estimator (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2006). This method 
seems particularly interesting in the present research study because it specifically takes into account 
the information contained in the zero or missing data, which are potentially numerous in case of 
econometric modelling at disaggregated product data level.  
The main problem is to choose the appropriate selection variable. Recent research at firm level 
(Melitz, 2003) suggests that in case of different productivity levels between firms, the existence of 
fixed costs produces a selection of the firms. As a result, only the most productive ones succeed in 
exporting whereas the others remain in the domestic market. This suggests that productivity at firm 
level can be used as the selection variable in this kind of model. Unfortunately, in the present research, 
data are not available at firm level so that this selection variable cannot be implemented.  
However, as already explained in section 1, it can also be considered that political problems between 
countries also influence the decision of firms to export. Consequently, it will be assumed that 
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Mediterranean countries are more likely to trade with traditional partners (EU-15) whereas the 
probability to export will be low with Israel, for political reasons. As a sensitivity analysis, the lagged 
export variable will also be used as the selection variable. As already explained in section 1, this can 
be justified by considering hysteresis in international trade (Baldwin & Krugman, 1989).  
Finally, as an additional sensitivity analysis, the estimators are also controlled for cross-sectional 
heteroskedascticity as well as serial correlation of the error term by using appropriate Feasible GLS. 
2.4 Estimation and results 
Equation (1.8) is estimated for the imports of the nine MED countries described above. However, data 
for Syria proved to be of poor quality so this country was eventually removed. As already mentioned, 
the estimation is implemented at the year for which NTMs are available (generally 1999 or 2001). The 
partner countries include the whole Euromed area (i.e. the EU-15, Central and Eastern EU countries 
(CEECs) as well as the eight Mediterranean countries described above, after Syria is excluded, besides 
Libya and Palestine, due to the lack of data in the trade, transport and other databases). Thus, 33 
partner countries are included. The dataset also includes a product decomposition level at digit-2. 
Estimations are presented in Table 4 for the Heckman two-stage procedure. Table 5 provides a 
sensitivity analysis by showing alternative estimators (fixed-effects vector decomposition, Hausman 
and Taylor, Feasible GLS) as well an alternative proxy for transport costs, i.e. distance. 
Table 4 clearly shows that NTMs have a detrimental effect on trade in all Mediterranean countries. As 
a matter of fact, all parameter estimates are significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, Algeria exhibits 
the highest coefficient in absolute value (-0.694). Jordan and Egypt show intermediate levels for the 
parameter estimates (about -0.5) whereas Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon present the lowest 
coefficients (from -0.31 to 0.38). These results can be compared to those corresponding to AVEs 
(Figure 2). Indeed, there is generally a correlation between the magnitude of the AVEs and the trade 
effects of NTMs. As a matter of fact, Algeria shows the highest AVE and the greatest trade impact of 
NTMs. Conversely, Morocco and Tunisia exhibit the lowest AVEs and the smaller trade impact of 
NTMs. 
To sum up, NTMs significantly reduce bilateral trade in all Mediterranean countries. This means that 
whatever the past efforts of trade liberalisation, both at multilateral and regional level, NTMs remain 
significant obstacles to trade. However, this impact differs depending on the country considered, i.e. 
with a more detrimental impact in the case of Algeria and a less detrimental impact for Morocco and 
Tunisia. This reflects pretty well the difference in the openness of these countries. 
It must also be noted that it is the existence of NTMs that is trade-reducing, given that NTMs are 
measured as a dummy variable. As a sensitivity analysis, the model has been estimated by using 
another proxy which includes the number of NTMs for each product. Results, although significant, are 
less relevant. This means that a marginal increase in the number of NTMs (let us say from 19 to 20 
NTMs in a given product) has far fewer trade-reducing effects than when we move from no NTM to 
the existence of NTMs (which is captured by the dummy variable). Additional discussion will be 
provided in Part 2 when simulating the effects of NTM reduction or elimination. 
Table 4 also shows that tariffs reduce trade significantly in Algeria and Tunisia. Again, this result can 
be related to the fact that these two countries exhibit the highest tariff protection levels in 2001. On the 
other hand, Lebanon presents the lowest coefficient (-0.055). Turkey, Jordan, Morocco and Israel also 
show a low coefficient.  
At this stage, it should be noted that the differences in the magnitude of the parameter estimates 
related to tariffs and NTMs cannot be strictly compared, since both variables are not measured 
identically. In other words, the fact the tariff coefficient is lower than the NTM one in Algeria does not 
necessarily mean that tariffs are more trade-reducing than NTMs, since tariffs are measured ad-
valorem and NTMs are measured as a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 in case of no NTMs 
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and 1 in case of the presence of at least one NTM. This question will be fully addressed in Part II 
when comparing together the trade impact of all trade costs (tariffs, NTMs and transport costs). 
The transport coefficient also provides interesting information in Tables 4 and 5. In this regard, it must 
be observed that all countries show a negative coefficient. This coefficient is significant for all 
countries except Egypt, and possibly Israel and Jordan (refer to sensitivity analysis in Table 5). By and 
large, this result suggests that transport costs are generally trade-reducing in the Euromed area (EU-15, 
other EU countries and Mediterranean countries). 
Turkey and Maghreb countries exhibit the largest effects, unlike Mashrek countries, which show lower 
or even insignificant effects. This result can be mainly explained by the fact that average freight costs 
are lower in Egypt and Israel than in Maghreb countries. As a matter of fact, Table 6 shows the 
unweighted average of freight costs for each Mediterranean country towards six EU countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK). Interestingly, Egypt and Israel show the lowest 
trade costs, i.e. below 1300 US$ for each container. Conversely, the Maghreb countries and Turkey 
have the highest freight costs to the EU (up to 1867 US$ in Algeria). This means that it is more costly 
to ship goods from Maghreb countries to Europe than from Mashrek. This result may appear as 
counterintuitive at first sight since Maghreb countries are closer to Europe than Mashrek countries. 
However, transport costs do not depend only on distance between two countries but also on many 
other factors, such as port efficiency. In any case, the fact that Egypt and Israel show lower transport 
costs than Maghreb countries is helpful in explaining why the negative impact of transport costs on 
trade is less in Mashrek countries.13  
Interestingly, estimation parameters for partners’ LPI are always positive but significant only for 
Turkey and Israel. However, the relevance of this variable is limited by the fact that it does not test the 
impact of logistics efficiency in each MENA country considered, but rather the impact of partners’ 
LPI. Since most partner countries are EU countries, and since there are no major significant 
differences in LPI across EU countries, it is not so surprising that the parameter estimates are not 
always significant.  
More interestingly, the estimation of MED countries’ LPI is positive and significant.14 This suggests 
that any improvement of logistics in MED countries is expected to increase trade with their partners, 
especially because this improvement will contribute to reducing transport cost, inefficiency and time. 
As a matter of fact, a 1% decrease in LPI makes it possible to increase MED countries imports by 
1.95%. An extension to MED countries’ exports shows that a 1% decrease in LPI leads to an export 
increase of 2.96%. 
The other variables are generally significant while showing the expected sign of the corresponding 
parameter estimate. For example, the size of the market (measured by the sum of GDPs) is always 
positive and significant. This shows that trade always increases with the market size of the origin and 
destination countries. The existence of past colonial links is also trade-creating, especially for Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia. The variable corresponding to a common language is also significant in 
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon.15 
Overall, the robustness of these results is checked by the sensitivity analysis presented in Table 5. It is 
striking to observe that the parameter estimates related to NTMs and tariffs are fairly stable whatever 
the estimator applied. The transport coefficient is also stable, except for some countries for which 
                                                     
13 Results should be interpreted cautiously for some countries where transport costs are not directly available, 
like Jordan. In this case, the coefficient can be biased. For this country, the sensitivity analysis implemented in 
Table 5 provides significant and negative results by using distance instead of the estimated transport costs. 
14 It must be remembered that the corresponding parameter estimate has been calculated for all MED countries 
taken together as a means of increasing the number of observations.  
15 With regard to Turkey, it must be noted that there is no colonial link and no common language with other 
countries in the EU. This explains the lack of parameter estimates corresponding to these variables. 
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direct data are unavailable (Jordan and Lebanon). This is why the parameter estimates calculated with 
transport costs must be cross-checked with those calculated with distance. 
At the stage of the analysis, the overall conclusions are the following (these results must still be 
interpreted cautiously since they sometimes rely on old data, especially NTMs): 
1) Trade costs significantly reduce imports to Mediterranean countries from their partners in the EU. 
2) Tariffs are import-reducing, but mainly in the countries which showed the highest tariff levels 
(Algeria and Tunisia). This suggests that the shallow integration was not fully achieved in these 
countries. Despite further tariff cuts since 2001, tariffs remain significant in these countries in 
recent years. As a result, significant gains can still be expected from shallow integration in these 
countries. 
3) NTMs are significantly trade-reducing in all countries, especially Algeria. On the other hand, they 
are less trade-reducing in Morocco and Tunisia, though still significant. This means that 
eliminating NTMs in Mediterranean countries as a move towards deeper integration with the EU is 
expected to provide significant gains. 
4) Transport costs significantly reduce trade, especially in Maghreb countries, since these countries 
show the highest freight costs (Figure 5). More generally, it seems that any improvement of 
logistics performance in MED countries is expected to increase imports from their partners, since 
this contributes to reduce transport costs, inefficiency and time. As a result, any deep integration 
policy which could stimulate the improvement of LPIs in MED countries (but also in the EU) is 
expected to provide additional gains. 
5) A similar analysis for MED country exports shows that tariffs have no impact, since the MED 
countries’ partners inside the Euromed area have removed their tariffs. However, it seems 
reasonable to believe that NTMs applied by the EU have an impact on MED countries exports, 
although this impact is limited by the fact that the AVE applied by the EU is lower than that 
applied by MED countries. Finally, it seems that the most important impact may be found in 
logistics, since we have shown that MED countries’ exports are significantly reduced by their low 
LPI. In this regard, any improvement of logistics in MED countries should significantly increase 
their exports towards the EU.  
Figure 5. Average freight costs to EU markets (US$, unweighted average) 
 
Source: Calculations from Source: Maersk Line (2007). 
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These results pave the way for additional research left to Part II of this study. The main questions to be 
investigated are the following: 
- What is the trade creation that can be expected for the completion of shallow integration between 
Mediterranean countries and their partners? This question will be addressed by simulating the 
impact of tariff removal on trade flows. 
- Is there additional trade creation if Mediterranean countries move to deep integration, including 
both NTM reduction and LPI improvement? This will be tackled not only by simulating the 
impact of reduction in NTMs but also transport costs and LPI. 
These questions will be investigated in Part II by appropriate trade modelling that takes into account 
the results already obtained. 
Table 4. Estimation results: the impact of tariffs, NTMs, transports and other variables on MED 
countries' imports   
Source: Own estimation. 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis (imports' determinants using alternative variables and estimators) 
Source: own estimation. 
  
Heckman Twostep Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
independent:
NTMs ‐0.694*** ‐0.525*** ‐0.499*** ‐0.383*** ‐0.315*** ‐0,336*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.060*** ‐0.678*** ‐0.237*** ‐0.055** ‐0.322*** ‐1.137*** ‐0.521*** ‐0.340***
transport ‐3.044*** ‐0.239 ‐0.201 ‐1.375*** ‐4.696*** ‐2.398*** ‐1.568*** ‐4.126***
sum gdp 0.677*** 0.704*** 0.260*** 0.303*** 0.906*** 1.097*** 1.177*** 1.977***
colony 1.409*** 0.386** 0.106*** 0.295*** 0.830*** 0.799** 0.045 ‐
common language 0,191 ‐0,160 0.470*** 0.204*** 0.811*** 0.686*** 0.209 ‐
constant 17.409** 1.345*** ‐0.488 8.032*** 1.543*** 6.979** 1.057 8.789**
selection:
partner type ‐0,264** ‐0.414** ‐0.361*** ‐0.398*** ‐0.372** ‐0.295** ‐0.455*** ‐0.366***
nb obs. 1544 1655 1533 1984 1820 1944 1937 2740
censored obs 68 451 172 203 328 275 395 722
sentitivity analysis
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
Heckman Twostep
distance ‐0.606*** ‐0.127 ‐0.238*** ‐0.278*** ‐1.168*** ‐0.899*** ‐0.074 ‐0.741***
partner's LPI ‐1.566 ‐1.871 ‐1.422 ‐1.631 ‐1.327 ‐1.666 2.819*** 3.932***
MENA countries' LPI 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95**
Fixed‐effects vector decomposition ( FEVD, product‐invariant and endogeneity)
NTMs ‐0.699*** ‐0.511*** ‐0.519*** ‐0.386*** ‐0.298*** ‐0,345*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.119*** ‐0.679*** ‐0.240*** ‐0.051** ‐0.314*** ‐1.183*** ‐0.476*** ‐0.349***
transport ‐3.039*** ‐0.236 ‐0.197 ‐1.355*** ‐3.937*** ‐2.399*** ‐1.607*** ‐3,954***
Hausman‐Taylor (endogeneity)
NTMs ‐0.699*** ‐0.510*** ‐0.519*** ‐0.387*** ‐0.298*** ‐0,345*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.117*** ‐0.679*** ‐0.240*** ‐0.051** ‐0.314*** ‐1.183*** ‐0.475*** ‐0.349***
transport ‐3.730*** ‐3.024 ‐2.538 ‐1.264*** ‐5.210*** ‐2.524*** ‐1.439*** ‐4.555***
FGLS (panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation)
NTMs ‐0.680*** ‐0.471*** ‐0.497*** ‐0.402*** ‐0.307*** ‐0,282** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.145*** ‐0.665*** ‐0.252*** ‐0.053** ‐0.315*** ‐1.125*** ‐0.501*** ‐0.373***
transport ‐2.895*** ‐0.131 ‐0.218 ‐1.307*** ‐3,528*** ‐2.492*** ‐1.611*** ‐3.702***
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Part II. Integration with the EU and within the Region: Simulated 
Scenarios of Shallow vs. Deep Integration 
3. Shallow vs. deep integration: definition of the scenarios 
According to the trade modelling developed in Part 1 and given the data available, Table 6 shows the 
various simulations and scenarios that will be implemented. In each case, we will distinguish between 
a partial move towards shallow and deep integration (pessimistic scenario), and full integration 
(optimistic scenario).  
Table 6. Simulations used for shallow and deep integration 
 
Source: own proposal. 
As stated previously, the tariff liberalisation process in Mediterranean countries is not complete (see 
Table 1 in Part I). As a matter of fact, the latest data available show that MFN tariffs range from 6% 
(Israel) to 32% (Tunisia). In the same way, applied tariffs (i.e. including preferential tariffs) range 
from 1.2% (Turkey) to 18% (Tunisia). Consequently, the simulations for shallow integration will 
consider the marginal effect of tariff reductions as the pessimistic scenario (partial liberalisation) as 
well as their complete removal as the optimistic scenario (full liberalisation). 
Deep integration includes two tools. The first is NTMs. As mentioned previously, NTMs are still 
highly significant in Mediterranean countries according to the dataset used. Indeed, Figure 2 shows 
that the tariff equivalent of NTMs can be scaled from 22.1% (Morocco and Egypt) to 35.6% (Algeria). 
Again, two types of simulations can be performed: marginal effects in the reduction of NTMs and a 
complete removal (pessimistic and optimistic scenarios). 
In addition, transport costs or more generally logistics inefficiencies can also be considered as trade 
barriers, although they are not product-specific. In this regard, it has been shown previously that the 
average transport costs differ greatly across Mediterranean countries (from less than $1,300 for Egypt 
and Israel to almost $1,900 for Algeria concerning imports from EU countries). In addition, the 
average freight costs faced by Mediterranean countries which import from Europe is $1,436. This is 
much greater than the average costs corresponding to EU countries’ imports ($1,235). This difference 
amounts to 15% (Table 7). This means that transport costs not only depend on oil prices, but also on 
many other variables which can have trade-reducing effects. In particular these are port efficiency 
(port infrastructure and services), scale economies, market structures (competition for trade routes) as 
well as directional traffic imbalance (Figueiredo, 2010). This means that a reduction in these trade-
related costs can be viewed as a further step towards deep integration in Mediterranean countries.  
Given that LPI is a wider concept than transport costs, it will be used as the reference variable for the 
scenarios. In the simulations, the pessimistic scenario will be built up on the assumption of a marginal 
increase in LPI whereas in the optimistic scenario, it will be assumed that LPI improves to the level 
reached in middle income countries, such as Mexico, Argentina and Central and Eastern European 
countries (i.e. 3.05). This level also corresponds to the case where countries reach the 66% of highest 
performers (World Bank, 2011a). 
 
 
                                             Shallow Integration                      Deep Integration
Partial (pessimistic scenario) Full (optimistic scenario)                Partial (Pessimistic)                      Full (Optimistic)
Tariffs Tariffs NTMs LPI NTMs LPI
Marginal cut Complete removal Marginal cut Marginal cut Complete removal increase to 3.05
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Table 7. A comparison of freight costs between EU and Mediterranean countries 
(in US dollars, average costs, 2007) 
 
Source: own calculations from Maersk (2007). 
Before presenting the results of these simulations, the methodology implemented for them must be 
carefully described. This is undertaken in Section 4.  
4. The implementation of the simulations: calculating the trade creation effect of 
shallow vs. deep integration 
In this section, we distinguish partial integration and full integration from a methodological viewpoint. 
As mentioned previously, partial integration can be captured by the marginal effects shown directly by 
the parameter estimates corresponding to tariffs, NTMs and LPI. Simulation can thus be derived 
directly from Tables 4 and 5, since the model has been estimated on a log-log basis. In this case, the 
parameter estimates show directly the effects of a 1% decrease in trade costs on trade in Mediterranean 
countries.16 These marginal effects will be reported in the next section as the trade creation due to 
partial shallow or deep integration (pessimistic scenario).  
On the other hand, full integration cannot be grasped by the marginal effects, since it corresponds to a 
100% reduction in trade costs (except logistics) or at least to a very significant reduction, i.e. towards 
levels reached in middle income countries. Consequently, a specific methodology must be 
implemented in order to capture the full effects of tariffs and NTMs removal. The methodology 
proposed here has been commonly used in the literature for the calculation of trade creation due to 
regional integration from a standard dummy variable (refer for instance to Péridy, 2005). This 
methodology is refined here by considering specific variables corresponding to tariffs and NTMs. 
Basically, the gross trade creation due to the full removal of tariffs (shallow integration) or NTMs 
(deep integration) is defined by replacing equation (1.8) by: 
jkjkjk TARHXX lnlnln 2α+=  (2.1a) 
Or: 
ijkjkjk NTMsHXX 3lnln α+=  (2.1b) 
                                                     
16 The only change which must be made is the replacement of the binary variable corresponding to NTMs by a 
variable which shows the number of NTMs. The corresponding parameter shows the percentage change in trade 
due to the 1% reduction in the number of NTMs. 
Mediterranean Average 1436
Egypt 1261
Israel 1287
Tunisia 1354
Turkey 1422
Morocco 1426
Algeria 1867
Europe Average 1235
Netherlands 1109
Spain 1129
Germany 1213
UK 1286
France 1462
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where lnHXjk reflects the hypothetical exports to Mediterranean countries, assuming no tariff (equation 
2.1a) or no NTM (equation 2.1b). Indeed, lnHXjk is equal to: 
ijtkjjjjjkjjk COLLANGTRANSCOSTNTMSUMGDPHX εϕφαααααα ++++++++= lnlnlnlnlnln 654310  (2.2a) 
or: 
ijtkjjjjjkjjk COLLANGTRANSCOSTTARSUMGDPHX εϕφαααααα ++++++++= lnlnlnlnlnln 654210  (2.2b) 
On the other hand, the specific effects of tariffs and NTMs are captured by the TAR and NTM 
variables in the right hand side of equations (2.1a) and (2.1b). These variables must be defined as 
dummies which take the value of unity in case of no tariff (or NTMs) and zero otherwise (in log 
terms). Defined like this, these variables show the impact of the presence or the absence of tariff 
(NTMs) and will be used for simulating the impact of full integration versus the current situation. 
Indeed, the gross trade creation due to the removal of tariffs and NTMs can now be defined as the 
difference between observed and hypothetical trade to Mediterranean countries: 
jkjk HXXG −=  (2.3) 
Replacing HXjk from equation (2.3) into equations (2.1a) and (2.1b)  and giving TARjk and NTMjk the 
value corresponding to full integration (lnTARjk=1 and lnNTMjk=1), it comes: 
eGXX jkjk ln)ln(ln 2α+−=  (2.4a) 
or: 
eGXX jkjk ln)ln(ln 3α+−=  (2.4b) 
This makes it possible to derive G as follows: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
2
11 αe
XG jk  (2.5a) 
in case of full shallow integration (tariff removal), or: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
3
11 αe
XG jk  (2.5b) 
in case of full deep integration (NTM removal). In equations 2.5a and 2.5b, the term in brackets 
corresponds to the trade creation as a percentage of observed exports. It ranges from 0 to 1, i.e. from 
0% to 100%. It equals zero when there is no trade effects of tariffs (or NTMs). In this case, α2(α3) is 
insignificant. Conversely, as α increases towards infinity, the gross trade creation increases 
exponentially towards 100%. 
The model can also be solved in order to calculate simultaneously the impact of shallow and deep 
integration. In this case, it is easy to show that the gross trade creation is equal to: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= + 32
11 ααe
XG jk  (2.6) 
Please note that the trade creation is not an additive function. This means that the gross trade creation 
calculated separately for tariffs and NTMs in equations 2.5a and 2.5b do not add together to that 
calculated simultaneously in equation 2.6. This is due the mathematical properties of the trade creation 
function.  
With regard to LPI, as already mentioned, it is expected that MED countries reached the level of 
middle-income country. The parameter estimate is that used in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Tables 8 and 9 exhibit the estimation results and the sensitivity analysis of the gravity model specially 
estimated for the simulations. The sensitivity analysis provides estimation results using alternative 
estimators and/or alternative independent variables (e.g. LPI instead of transport costs). As already 
mentioned, this model requires some changes in the measurement of the tariffs and the NTM 
variables. The econometric methodology is the same as that used previously. It thus presents the 
Heckman two-step procedure as the main estimator. In addition, a sensitivity analysis is included 
through the use of alternative estimators, i.e. the FEVD, the Hausman and Taylor as well as the FGLS. 
As expected, results are very close to those already found previously, but the parameter estimates 
corresponding to tariffs and NTMs are more appropriate for the simulations, which will be presented 
and discussed in the following section.17 
Table 8. Parameter estimates used for full liberalisation (dependent variables: MED countries’ 
imports) 
Source: own estimation. 
 
 
                                                     
17 Please note that the parameters corresponding to tariffs and NTMs are positive in Table 2. This is expected 
since these parameters are calculated as dummies which take the value of zero in case of positive tariffs (or 
NTMs) and 1 otherwise. These dummies will be used for the calculation of trade creation following equation 
2.5a and 2.5b. 
Heckman Twostep Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
independent:
no ntm 0.906*** 0.510*** 0.496*** 0.382*** 0.277*** 0.335*** ‐ ‐
no tariffs 0.848** 0.490 0.071 0.072 0.281 0.564* 0.001 0.029
transport ‐3.100*** 0.030 ‐0.125 ‐1.382*** ‐4.722*** ‐2.483*** ‐1.758*** ‐3.671***
sum gdp 0.650*** 0.676*** 0.252*** 0.304*** 0.912*** 1.047*** 1.157*** 1.929***
colony 1.447*** 0.340* 0.079 0.296*** 0.830*** 0.900*** 0.077 ‐
common language 0.082 ‐0,137 0.445*** 0.26*** 0.811*** 0.593*** 0.310 ‐
constant 19.041** ‐3.939 ‐0.449 8.260*** 1.555*** 8.933** 1.060 6.984*
selection:
partner type ‐0,264** ‐0.415** ‐0.345*** ‐0.398*** ‐0.372** ‐0.291** ‐0.440*** ‐0.353***
nb obs. 1560 1657 1606 1984 1820 1959 2232 2930
censored obs 68 451 172 203 328 275 395 722
sentitivity analysis
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
Heckman Twostep
partner's LPI 0.413 0.947 1.096 1.625 1.173 1.141 2.177** 3.885***
MENA countries' LPI 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95**
Fixed‐effects vector decomposition ( FEVD, product‐invariant and endogeneity)
no ntm 0.919*** 0.498*** 0.514*** 0.383*** 0.262** 0.341** ‐ ‐
no tariffs 0.867** 0.424 0.101 0.081 0.410 0.512 0.001 0.023
transport ‐3.099*** ‐0.234 ‐0.130 ‐1.362*** ‐3.903*** ‐2.491*** ‐1.685*** ‐3.481***
Hausman‐Taylor (endogeneity)
no ntm 0.947*** 0.498*** 0.514*** 0.384*** 0.262*** 0.341*** ‐ ‐
no tariffs 0.919* 0.424 0.101 0.082 0.411 0.512 0.001 0.023
transport ‐3.221*** ‐1.041 ‐2.597 ‐1.264*** ‐5.085*** ‐2.214*** ‐1.374*** ‐4.580***
FGLS (panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation)
no ntm 0.915*** 0.485*** 0.489*** ‐0.401*** 0.281*** 0.279** ‐ ‐
no tariffs 0.810* 0.418 0.07 0.08 0.187 0.556 0.001 0.045
transport ‐2.917*** ‐0.160 ‐0.143 ‐1.317*** ‐3.475*** ‐2.567*** ‐1.637*** ‐3.359***
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Table 9. Parameter estimates used for partial liberalisation (marginal effects) (dependent variable: 
MED countries’ imports) 
Source: own estimation. 
 
5. Estimation results: the calculation of trade creation effects of shallow and deep 
integration 
Using the parameters corresponding to tariffs, NTMs and transport costs in Table 8, this section will 
first present the trade creation effects due to full integration corresponding to shallow and deep 
integration (optimistic scenario). Thereafter, it will also present the marginal effects expected from 
partial integration (pessimistic scenario), using parameters from Table 9.  
5.1 Trade creation due to shallow and deep integration (full removal of tariffs and 
NTMs): the optimistic scenario 
Table 10 and Figure 6 show the results of trade creation as a percentage of Mediterranean imports 
corresponding to equations 2.5a, 2.5b and 2.6. For each country, three columns are presented first.  
They correspond to the trade creation due to the removal of tariffs, NTMs and both, respectively. As 
already explained previously, the trade creation due to tariffs and NTMs cannot strictly be added. This 
is why the trade creation presented in the last column is not equal to the sum of that calculated in the 
first two columns. When the parameter estimates corresponding to tariffs are statistically insignificant, 
we assume that trade creation due to shallow integration (tariff removal) is also insignificant. In this 
case, the overall effect is the same as that corresponding to the removal of NTMs (deep integration). 
Besides, a fourth column is introduced to take into account additional trade creation due to 
Heckman Twostep Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
independent:
NTMs ‐0.115*** ‐0.012* 0.01 ‐0.046*** ‐0.0033* ‐0.014*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.076*** ‐0.679*** ‐0.240*** ‐0.060** ‐0.300*** ‐0.907*** ‐0.052*** ‐0.034***
transport ‐3.124*** ‐0.266 ‐0.224 ‐1.397*** ‐4.688*** ‐2.404*** ‐1.568*** ‐4.126***
sum gdp 0.675*** 0.704*** 0.261*** 0.304*** 0.908*** 1.099*** 1.177*** 1.977***
colony 1.403*** 0.394** 0.118 0.295*** 0.833*** 0.802** 0.045 ‐
common language 0.190 ‐0.188 0.485*** 0.210*** 0.807*** 0.684*** 0.209 ‐
constant 17.162** ‐2.612 ‐0.111 8.228*** 1.081*** 6.992** 1.057 8.789**
selection:
partner type ‐0,264** ‐0.414** ‐0.361*** ‐0.398*** ‐0.372** ‐0.296*** ‐0.455*** ‐0.366***
nb obs. 1544 1655 1533 1984 1820 1944 1937 2740
censored obs 68 451 172 203 328 275 395 722
sentitivity analysis
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
Heckman Twostep
partner's LPI 1.663 1.870 1.203 1.612 1.293 1.704 2.818*** 3.932***
MENA countries' LPI 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95** 1.95**
Fixed‐effects vector decomposition ( FEVD, product‐invariant and endogeneity)
NTMs ‐0.115*** ‐0.023*** 0.01 ‐0.046*** ‐0.0033* ‐0.014*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.056*** ‐0.681*** ‐0.241*** ‐0.055** ‐0.292*** ‐0.824*** ‐0.047*** ‐0.034***
transport ‐3.124*** ‐0.266 ‐0.224 ‐1.376*** ‐3.921*** ‐2.406*** ‐1.607*** ‐3,954***
Hausman‐Taylor (endogeneity)
NTMs ‐0.115*** ‐0.012* 0.01 ‐0.047*** ‐0.0095** ‐0.014*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.066*** ‐0.681*** ‐0.241*** ‐0.055** ‐0.292*** ‐0.824*** ‐0.047*** ‐0.035***
transport ‐3.821*** ‐0.648 ‐0.984 ‐1.264*** ‐5.010*** ‐2.256*** ‐1.439*** ‐4.555***
FGLS (panel heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation)
NTMs ‐0.115*** ‐0.012* 0.01 ‐0.048*** ‐0.0033* ‐0.014*** ‐ ‐
tariffs ‐1.069*** ‐0.667*** ‐0.256*** ‐0.059** ‐0.295*** ‐0.872*** ‐0.050*** ‐0.037***
transport ‐2.921*** ‐0.168 ‐0.251 ‐1.331*** ‐3,515*** ‐2.519*** ‐1.611*** ‐3.702***
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improvement of logistics. In the optimistic scenario, it is assumed that MED countries improve their 
LPI toward the 66% of highest performers, i.e. an LPI index equal to 3.05. This level is recorded in 
several middle-income countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile and some Central and Eastern EU 
countries.  
In addition, three lines are presented for each country. They reflect the minimum, maximum and 
average trade creation. These are calculated from Table 8 by taking respectively the lowest, highest 
and average parameter estimates amongst the four available estimators (Heckman two-step, FEVD, 
Hausman and Taylor, as well as FGLS). This makes it possible to define margins of error in the 
calculation of trade creation. In this regard, it can be observed that this margin is generally very thin. 
This is an indication of the fair robustness of the econometric results. Concerning the column related 
to LPI, the minimum and maximum are calculated by taking -10% or +10% from the average scenario. 
A first crucial result is that trade creation due to deep integration (removal of NTMs) is very 
significant in all countries. In particular, the trade creation for Algeria amounts to 60.4% of its current 
imports (bear in mind that the maximum is 100%). Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon also exhibit high 
potential for import increases if they remove their NTMs (from 32% in Lebanon to 39% in Egypt). 
Tunisia and Morocco show the lowest trade creation (about 25%), although this percentage is still very 
significant.  
Overall, these results can usefully be related to the calculation of AVEs and the results of the gravity 
model presented in Tables 2 and 4. Indeed, it has been shown that the most trade-reducing impact of 
NTMs concerned Algeria and the smaller impact involved Morocco and Tunisia. Hence, the results for 
trade creation strongly correlate with our previous conclusions. However, these results go further since 
they make it possible to quantify and scale from 0% to 100% the specific impact of deep integration 
(NTM reduction). In particular, it shows that this impact is very huge for Algeria.  
These results are also consistent with those found in De Wulf and Maliszewska (2009), which state 
that deep integration could lead to significant trade gains. 
The gains due to deep integration can also be increased by logistics improvement. As a matter of fact, 
Table 10a and Figure 6a show that these gains are very significant for Algeria (+57%). This is due to 
the fact that this country faces a very poor logistics performance (the LPI is currently equal to 2.36). 
Consequently, an improvement towards middle income countries’ LPI (3.05) would lead to very 
significant import increases. Significant trade gains are also expected for Morocco (44%). However, it 
must be remembered that this gain is based on LPI data from 2007 and does not take into account the 
efforts of the Moroccan authorities to increase their logistics performance in most recent years. As a 
result, the gain expected in Table 10a may be overestimated compared to the other countries for which 
LPI data are updated. Egypt and Jordan also show significant effects expected from logistics 
improvement (increase in imports by 32% and 21% respectively), whereas gains for Tunisia are 
smaller (14%) since this country is already close to the LPI level equal to 3.05. No gain is expected for 
Turkey, Israel and Lebanon, which have already exceeded this LPI level. 
To sum up, deep integration is expected to lead to significant import increases in MED countries, both 
because of removal of NTMs and improvement of logistics. This result is in line with World Bank 
(2011b), which identified that market access for MED countries' exports remains a major problem, 
which is mainly due to the high prevalence of NTMs.  
 
 
 
 
 
24 | GHONEIM, PÉRIDY, LOPEZ GONZALEZ & MENDEZ PARRA 
Table 10a. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic scenario) (from 
significant parameter estimates only)  
 
Ns: Insignificant parameter estimate. 
Source: own estimation. 
Figure 6a. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic scenario) (average 
from significant parameter estimates only) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
Tariffs NTMs Both TPI
Algeria min 57.2% 59.6% 82.7% 51.2%
max 60.1% 61.2% 84.5% 62.6%
average 58.6% 60.4% 83.6% 56.9%
Egypt min ns 38.4% 38.4% 29.5%
max ns 40.0% 40.0% 36.1%
average ns 39.2% 39.2% 32.8%
Jordan min ns 38.7% 38.7% 18.9%
max ns 40.2% 40.2% 23.1%
average ns 39.4% 39.4% 21.0%
Lebanon min ns 31.8% 31.8% 0.0%
max ns 33.0% 33.0% 0.0%
average ns 32.4% 32.4% 0.0%
Tunisia min ns 24.3% 24.3% 12.3%
max 43.1% 28.9% 59.5% 15.1%
average 21.5% 26.6% 41.9% 13.7%
Morocco min ns 23.0% 23.0% 39.7%
max ns 24.5% 24.5% 48.5%
average ns 23.8% 23.8% 44.1%
Israel min ns ‐ ‐ 0.0%
max ns ‐ ‐ 0.0%
average ns ‐ ‐ 0.0%
Turkey min ns ‐ ‐ 0.0%
max ns ‐ ‐ 0.0%
average ns ‐ ‐ 0.0%
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A second interesting result relates to shallow integration, through tariff removal. In this regard, the 
trade creation is very significant for Algeria, i.e. 59%. Again, there is a strong correlation between this 
result and the fact that Algeria still applies very high tariffs, as shown in Section 1. Results for Tunisia 
are very sensitive to the estimator used in Table 8. As a matter of fact, Tunisia is a country which still 
showed significant tariffs, but to a lesser extent than Algeria. As a result, the parameter estimates are 
not always significant. This is why the calculation of trade creation exhibits a minimum of 0% (this 
corresponds to insignificant parameters in Part 1) and the maximum is 43% (for the highest significant 
parameters). For the other countries, parameter estimates related to tariffs show the expected sign, but 
are insignificant. This suggests that complete tariff removal is not expected to add a significant trade 
creation. This is an expected result since we showed that these countries have already strongly reduced 
their tariff protection (Part 1). As a result, no significant additional trade creation is expected. 
However, these results do not show that marginal effects of further reduction in tariffs are 
insignificant, as will be shown in sub-section b). 
In other words, tariffs do not have such a significant effect when compared to NTMs because 
parameter estimates are often insignificant. This reflects the fact that tariffs have been reduced in most 
MED countries, except mainly in Algeria.  
Finally, the combination of both tariff and NTM removal provides an overall trade creation that is 
huge for Algeria (83%), intermediate for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia (from 32% to 42%) and 
smaller for Morocco (24%). Again, these results reflect pretty well the overall liberalisation level 
reached by Mediterranean countries. This will have important policy implications, as developed later. 
At this stage, it must however be noted that we considered that positive, but statistically insignificant 
parameters corresponding to tariffs lead to insignificant trade effects. However, the results are affected 
by the threshold below which parameter become statistically insignificant. 
In Table 8, for example, the parameter corresponding to tariffs is statistically significant down to 0.564 
(Tunisia), but becomes statistically insignificant below this threshold. In the case of Egypt the value of 
the parameter is 0.490 (below the threshold).  Consequently, we assumed above that trade creation due 
to tariff removal is insignificant for Egypt, even if the parameter estimate is not equal to zero. 
Table 10b and Figure 6b provide the results by using the value of all parameter estimates, even if they 
are not significant. This has the advantage of solving the problem of the threshold significance. On the 
other hand, the drawback is that we consider that trade creation can be positive even if the 
corresponding parameter estimate is insignificant. 
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Table 10b. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic scenario) (from all 
parameter estimates) 
 
Source: Own estimation. 
Figure 6b. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (optimistic scenario) (average 
from all parameter estimates) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
Tariffs NTMs Both TPI
Algeria min 57.2% 59.6% 82.7% 51.2%
max 60.1% 61.2% 84.5% 62.6%
average 58.6% 60.4% 83.6% 56.9%
Egypt min 33.9% 38.4% 59.3% 29.5%
max 38.7% 40.0% 63.2% 36.1%
average 36.3% 39.2% 61.3% 32.8%
Tunisia min 40.1% 24.3% 54.7% 12.3%
max 43.1% 28.9% 59.5% 15.1%
average 41.6% 26.6% 57.1% 13.7%
Jordan min 6.8% 38.7% 42.8% 18.9%
max 9.6% 40.2% 45.9% 23.1%
average 8.2% 39.4% 44.4% 21.0%
Morocco min 17.1% 23.0% 36.2% 39.7%
max 33.7% 24.5% 49.9% 48.5%
average 25.4% 23.8% 43.1% 44.1%
Lebanon min 6.9% 31.8% 36.5% 0.0%
max 7.9% 33.0% 38.3% 0.0%
average 7.4% 32.4% 37.4% 0.0%
Israel min 0.1% ‐ ‐ 0.0%
max 0.1% ‐ ‐ 0.0%
average 0.1% ‐ ‐ 0.0%
Turkey min 2.3% ‐ ‐ 0.0%
max 4.4% ‐ ‐ 0.0%
average 0.1% ‐ ‐ 0.0%
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The results are slightly different from those presented in Table 10a and Figure 6a since shallow 
integration provides positive gains not only for Algeria and Tunisia, but also for Egypt and Morocco 
(which are slightly below the statistically significant threshold). However, results for Jordan, Lebanon, 
Israel and Turkey are similar to the previous ones with very small gains. Again, the country 
distribution of trade gains due to shallow integration is closely linked to the tariff levels applied by the 
countries concerned. This means that the gains are higher for countries like Algeria and Tunisia, which 
show the highest tariff levels. 
Results for deep integration are identical to those presented above, since all the corresponding 
parameter estimates are significant. Overall, trade creation due to shallow and deep integration is very 
high for Algeria. It is intermediate for Tunisia and Egypt and smaller for Morocco, Lebanon and 
Jordan. 
A last set of results can be provided concerning MED countries’ exports. Figure 7 summarises the 
export increases expected from shallow and deep integration. As expected, tariffs have no impact on 
MED countries’ exports since the EU has already removed its tariffs applied to the exports of the 
MED countries. This means that the shallow integration is already completed on the EU side. The 
export increases due to the removal of NTMs in the EU are significant (18.5%) but limited by the fact 
that the AVE in the EU (13.4%) is much lower than the AVEs in MED countries, as shown 
previously. This suggests that the removal of NTMs in MED countries and in the EU is expected to 
lead to a more important increase in MED countries’ imports than exports18. However, considerable 
export increase is expected from the improvement of MED countries LPI toward middle-income 
countries level. In this regard, the export effects shown in Figure 7 are greater that the import effects 
calculated previously, because the parameter estimate corresponding to LPI is equal to 2.96 for exports 
and only 1.95 for imports. In other words, the logistics improvement in MED countries should help 
them increase their exports more than their imports. 
Figure 7. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ exports (optimistic scenario) (average from 
all parameter estimates) 
  
Source: own estimation. 
                                                     
18 Due to a lack of data concerning NTBs in all EU countries, we rely on the AVE calculated by Kee et al. 
(2009).  Moreover, the export increase has been estimated assuming that trade effects for a given AVE is the 
same for all countries. For example, since the AVE in the EU is roughly half of the AVE calculated for MENA 
countries, it is expected that trade effects for EU imports are half of that calculated for EU exports. 
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5.2 Marginal effects of shallow and deep integration (partial integration): the pessimistic 
scenario 
Table 11 shows the marginal effects of shallow and deep integration, directly based on the parameter 
estimates derived in Section 4. It provides the percentage effects on exports to Mediterranean 
countries due to i) a 1% tariff cut; ii) a 1% reduction in the number of NTMs and iii) a 1% increase in 
LPI. In this regard, the magnitude of the parameters corresponding to tariffs, NTMs and LPI are not 
strictly comparable across themselves, since the measurement of these variables is not similar 
(percentage for tariffs, numbers for NTMs and value index for LPI). In addition, the results cannot be 
strictly compared to those presented in sub-section a), not only because the methodology is different, 
but also because the proxy variables for tariffs and NTMs are also different, due to methodological 
requirement. However, Tables 10 and 11 provide complementary results. 
Table 11. The pessimistic scenario: Percentage change in trade due to: 1% reduction in tariffs rates, 
1% reduction in the number of NTMs and 1% increase in LPI) 
 
ns: Insignificant parameter estimate. 
Source: own estimation. 
First, a 1% reduction in the number of NTMs does not increase trade very much (the maximum 
increase is 0.12% for Algeria and the minimum is insignificant for Jordan). This result does not 
contradict the one developed in sub-section a). It only suggests that a marginal (1%) reduction in the 
number of NTMs (for example from 20 to 19.8 barriers) does not significantly improve trade. This 
means that trade is less sensitive to the intensity of NTMs than to their existence. In other words, a 
significant trade creation is expected to occur provided that a significant amount of NTMs are 
removed whatever their initial number. Having said that, the country-scaling shown in Table 11 is 
consistent with that found previously. Indeed, the greatest effects are found for Algeria whereas the 
MENA countries' imports         MENA countries' exports
Tarifs NTMs LPI Tarifs NTMs LPI
Algeria min 1.06 0.12 1.75 0.00 0.06 2.66
max 1.08 0.12 2.05 0.00 0.06 2.26
average 1.07 0.12 1.95 0.00 0.06 2.96
Egypt min 0.67 0.01 1.75 0.00 0.01 2.66
max 0.68 0.02 2.05 0.00 0.01 3.26
average 0.68 0.02 1.95 0.00 0.01 2.96
Jordan min 0.24 0.01 1.75 0.00 0.01 2.66
max 0.26 0.01 2.05 0.00 0.01 3.26
average 0.25 0.01 1.95 0.00 0.01 2.96
Lebanon min 0.06 0.05 1.75 0.00 0.03 2.66
max 0.06 0.05 2.05 0.00 0.02 3.26
average 0.06 0.05 1.95 0.00 0.02 2.96
Tunisia min 0.87 0.01 1.75 0.00 0.01 2.66
max 0.92 0.01 2.05 0.00 0.01 3.26
average 0.90 0.01 1.95 0.00 0.01 2.96
Morocco min 0.29 0.01 1.75 0.00 0.01 2.66
max 0.30 0.01 2.05 0.00 0.01 3.26
average 0.30 0.01 1.95 0.00 0.01 2.96
Israel min 0.04 ‐ 1.75 0.00 ‐ 2.66
max 0.05 ‐ 2.05 0.00 ‐ 3.26
average 0.05 ‐ 1.95 0.00 ‐ 2.96
Turkey min 0.03 ‐ 1.75 0.00 ‐ 2.66
max 0.04 ‐ 2.05 0.00 ‐ 3.26
average 0.04 ‐ 1.95 0.00 ‐ 2.96
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smallest ones involve Morocco, Tunisia (and Jordan). Again, this result will have strong policy 
implications. 
As a second result, a 1% tariff reduction on MED countries’ imports has significant effects for 
Algeria, and Tunisia to a lesser extent, since it increases imports by 1.06% and 0.9% respectively. This 
is not surprising since these countries have the highest tariff levels. A moderate impact is expected for 
Egypt (0.68%) as well as Morocco, and Jordan to a lesser extent (about 0.3%). Conversely, these 
effects are less important in the other countries, especially Israel, Turkey and Lebanon (0.06%). These 
results can be compared to those found in sub-section a). In fact, the country scaling is very similar. 
Besides, as already mentioned, no gain is expected for MED countries exports, since the EU has 
already removed its tariffs for imports from MED countries. 
Finally, trade gains due to deep integration can also been reinforced further through the improvement 
of logistics in MED countries. As already mentioned, since the parameter estimates are greater for 
exports than for imports, MED countries are expected to increase their exports more than their imports 
due to improvements in logistics.  
6. The case of south-south integration 
This section provides specific insights into integration between MED countries. For that purpose, the 
model is estimated from a restricted country sample, which only includes MED countries as reporters 
and partner countries. This makes it possible to appraise the impact of tariffs, NTMs and transport 
costs within the MED countries’ area. As has been shown in Part I, tariffs across MED countries have 
been phased out during the GAFTA integration process (except Algeria). Consequently, all tariffs 
have been eliminated since 2005. However, some recent surveys indicate that the previous tariff 
protection has sometimes been replaced by additional NTM for specific products (Péridy & Ghoneim, 
2009). As a result, trade liberalisation across MED countries is still not yet fully completed. 
Figure 8 provides the simulation results due to full and marginal liberalisation with regard to MED 
countries’ imports. Since bilateral tariffs across MED countries have been removed since 2005, there 
is no effect of tariffs on trade.19 There are however three exceptions: the first is Algeria which has 
joined the GATFA area but has not started removing its tariffs in 2005. The other exceptions concern 
Israel and Turkey, which are outside the GAFTA area. 
The results concerning trade effects of NTMs are similar to those found in section 5. For example, in 
the case of full liberalisation, all MED countries show a significant impact of NTMs' reduction. In the 
same way, as in Section 5 and for the same reasons, NTMs' limited reductions provide smaller 
marginal gains because, as already discussed, marginal cuts in NTMs are not enough to increase trade. 
In addition, improvement in LPI leads to significant import increases, especially in Algeria due to its 
poor logistics performance. As in section 5, the import effects for Morocco may be over-estimated 
because estimation is based on data from 2007. This means that the recent improvement in LPI is not 
taken into account in the simulations. The same applies to Egypt which has undertaken significant 
logistics' improvement at the ports, though might be less than Morocco. 
Results concerning exports clearly indicate that in case of full liberalisation, the removal of NTMs 
provides significant export increases, generally about 35% (Figure 9). This means that MED countries 
can take advantage of the NTMs' removal across themselves in order to increase their exports. 
                                                     
19 Preliminary results which use MFN tariffs as an independent variable show that although bilateral tariffs have 
been removed across MED countries, MFN tariffs are still import-reducing in some countries which are GAFTA 
members. This unexpected result can be explained by the fact that the MFN tariff variable may capture some 
non-tariff protection. However, for consistency of the estimations, we used the zero tariff for all countries except 
Algeria, Turkey and Israel. 
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Interestingly, Algeria shows smaller gains, because the other MED countries apply lower NTMs than 
Algeria. This means that the remaining export potential is a bit smaller for Algeria, i.e. less than 30%.  
These gains must be added to those corresponding to LPI improvement. Given the high export 
elasticity corresponding to LPI (2.39), the export increases are particularly significant, especially for 
the countries which show the lowest logistics performance. As a matter of fact, the expected export 
increase is equal to about 70% for Algeria, 50% for Morocco and 40% for Egypt.  
To sum up, the optimistic scenario for deep integration shows very significant trade increases between 
the MED partners, both because of NTMs' removal and increase in LPI. Conversely, the shallow 
integration process is almost fully achieved through the GAFTA agreement. This is why trade increase 
is more limited. With regard to imports, only Algeria is expected to enjoy significant import increases, 
since this country has not applied the GAFTA agreement. Tunisia shows more limited gains, whereas 
in the other countries, no import increases are expected since they have already removed all tariffs on 
imports originating from the GAFTA area. Turning to exports, gains are also limited. Most countries 
are expected to increase their export by about 10%. This is due to the effects of the expected tariff 
liberalisation in Algeria. 
Turning to the pessimistic scenario (Table 12), marginal effects of both tariffs and NTMs' reduction 
are limited, as in the previous section. However, LPI improvement is expected to provide significant 
gains for most of the countries.  
Figure 8. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ imports (pessimistic scenario) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
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Figure 9. Percentage change in Mediterranean countries’ exports (pessimistic scenario) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
Table 12. The pessimistic scenario: Percentage change in trade due to: 1% reduction in tariffs rates, 
1% reduction in the number of NTMs and 1% increase in LPI) 
 
Source: own estimation. 
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MENA countries' imports       MENA countries' exports
Tarifs NTMs LPI Tarifs NTMs LPI
Algeria min 1.05 0.06 1.40 0.01 0.01 2.15
max 1.10 0.06 1.70 0.01 0.01 2.63
average 1.08 0.06 1.55 0.01 0.03 2.39
Egypt min 0.00 0.02 1.40 0.00 0.01 2.15
max 0.00 0.03 1.70 0.00 0.01 2.63
average 0.00 0.03 1.55 0.02 0.03 2.39
Jordan min 0.00 0.01 1.40 0.00 0.01 2.15
max 0.00 0.01 1.70 0.00 0.01 2.63
average 0.00 0.01 1.55 0.02 0.03 2.39
Lebanon min 0.00 0.03 1.40 0.00 0.01 2.15
max 0.00 0.04 1.70 0.00 0.01 2.63
average 0.00 0.04 1.55 0.02 0.03 2.39
Tunisia min 0.00 0.01 1.40 0.00 0.01 2.15
max 0.00 0.01 1.70 0.00 0.01 2.63
average 0.00 0.01 1.55 0.02 0.03 2.39
Morocco min 0.00 0.01 1.40 0.00 0.01 2.15
max 0.00 0.04 1.70 0.00 0.01 2.63
average 0.00 0.03 1.55 0.02 0.03 2.39
Israel min 0.17 ‐ 1.40 0.17 0.01 2.15
max 0.18 ‐ 1.70 0.18 0.01 2.63
average 0.18 ‐ 1.55 0.25 0.03 2.39
Turkey min 0.15 ‐ 1.40 0.15 0.01 2.15
max 0.19 ‐ 1.70 0.19 0.01 2.63
average 0.17 ‐ 1.55 0.19 0.03 2.39
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Part III. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The main findings of this paper are the following: 
1. The analysis of tariffs in Mediterranean countries shows that they are still significant in Algeria 
and (to a lesser extent) Tunisia. In the other countries, tariffs are much lower, especially in Israel 
and Turkey, which have almost completed their tariff liberalisation.  
2. Protection due to NTMs is generally much greater than that due to tariffs (except for Algeria and 
Tunisia). In addition, the calculation of AVEs shows high tariff-equivalents for Algeria but also 
Jordan. Conversely, Morocco, Tunisia but also Egypt exhibit the lowest AVEs (less than 25%). 
3. The implementation of a specific gravity model shows that trade costs significantly reduce MED 
countries’ imports from their partners in the Euromed area. In particular: 
a. Tariffs are trade reducing, mainly in the countries that showed the highest tariff levels (Algeria 
and Tunisia). This suggests that the shallow integration was not fully achieved in these 
countries. 
b. NTMs are significantly trade-reducing in all countries, especially in Algeria. On the other 
hand, they are less trade-reducing in Morocco and Tunisia, though significant. This means that 
eliminating NTMs in Mediterranean countries as a move toward deeper integration in the 
Euromed area is expected to provide significant gains. 
c. Transport costs significantly reduce trade in Mediterranean countries, as well as inefficiencies 
in logistics. 
4. In the same way, trade costs significantly reduce exports from MED countries to their partners in 
the Euromed area. In particular: 
a. Transport costs and logistics inefficiencies are particularly trade reducing. This is due to the 
gap between LPI in most MED countries on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. 
b. NTMs are also export-reducing but to a lesser extent than imports. This can mainly be 
explained by the fact that NTMs applied to MED countries’ exports (especially by the EU) are 
lower than those applied to MED countries imports (by themselves).  
c. Tariffs have minimal effects on exports, mainly because they have been removed in most 
countries in the Euromed area. 
5. The calculation of trade creation due to shallow and deep integration reveals that: 
a. Tariff removal is expected to produce moderate or limited gains, except in Algeria, and 
Tunisia (to a lesser extent), since both countries show higher tariffs than the other 
Mediterranean countries. Import increases are estimated to amount to 59% in Algeria and 42% 
in Tunisia. Egypt and Morocco show moderate import increases due to tariff removal (about 
30%). For the other countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Turkey), only a limited import 
increase can be expected from further shallow integration, since the potential gains have been 
almost fully achieved due to past tariff liberalisation, both multilaterally (GATT) and 
regionally (Barcelona agreement). The effects of tariff removal concerning exports of MED 
countries are also small, because most of their partners in the Euromed area have already 
removed their tariffs. 
b. Conversely, the elimination of NTMs is expected to lead to strong trade gains (while a 
marginal reduction in NTMs leads to much smaller gains because NTMs must be considerably 
reduced in order to provide significant gains). With regard to imports, the expected increase 
range from about 25% in Morocco and Tunisia to 60% in Algeria. The other countries are in 
intermediate positions, showing an imports increase that ranges from 32% (Lebanon) to 39% 
(Egypt and Jordan). Exports increases, although significant (35%) are, however, smaller than 
import increases, because the NTMs applied by the EU to exports of the MED countries’ are 
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lower than those applied by MED countries to their own imports. Overall, a strong trade 
creation is expected from deep integration. This result is consistent with that found in De Wulf 
and Maliszewska (2009). The main reason is that almost no progress has been made so far 
concerning the reduction in NTMs. 
c. Trade gains due to deep integration can also been reinforced further through the potential 
reduction in trade and logistics costs: as a matter of fact, import increases are expected to 
amount to up to 30% for Morocco and 45% for Algeria. Export increases are even more 
important due to higher export elasticities to LPI than import elasticities. In any case, the trade 
gains are particularly significant for those countries that show the greatest inefficiencies in 
their logistics, i.e. Algeria, Egypt and Morocco.  
d. The particular case of south-south integration provides similar results, i.e. gains from deep 
integration (NTMs and logistics) are important, whereas gains due to shallow integration are 
moderate (except in Algeria, which has not started its tariff liberalisation process vis-a-vis the 
other GAFTA members). 
These results lead to the following policy implications:20 
6. Mediterranean countries should complete their shallow integration with their EU partners and 
across themselves as a means of capturing the remaining trade gains available. In particular, 
Algeria should make efforts to reduce its tariffs, which currently remain at high levels. 
7. Dealing with deep integration is a more difficult task. First, NTMs must be addressed altogether, 
since we have shown that the removal of a particular NTM while keeping the other ones provides 
very limited benefits. As a result, each Mediterranean country should identify precisely all NTMs 
for each product and decide whether to remove all NTMs for this product or not. Of course, the 
removal of all NTMs for all products is not necessarily the right solution, since some NTMs may 
be useful at product level for specific reasons (sanitary, etc.). 
8. However, there are numerous NTMs in Mediterranean countries that strongly reduce trade. Some 
questions must be addressed with regard to their removal for specific products, by eliminating 
para-tariff measures or moving towards mutual technical standard recognition. In any case, a cost-
benefit analysis should be undertaken at product-level before embarking on NTMs elimination 
(especially in terms of short-term costs due to an increased competition with EU products). 
9. A second aspect of deep integration relates to the efficiency of logistics. In this regard, significant 
additional gains can be achieved through the extension of the Euro-Mediterranean integration as a 
means of improving LPI (port infrastructures, logistics services, etc.). In this regard, an increased 
cooperation in infrastructure-related projects is required. In addition, extending the financial 
cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean countries (through specific EIB loans) can also 
help improving the performance of logistics. 
  
                                                     
20 A broader analysis of the policy implications of border management may also be found in McLinden, G. et al. 
(2011). 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. A note on the MEDPRO scenarios and their relations with the simulations 
undertaken in this study 
The four MEDPRO scenarios consist of 1) the reference scenario which entails continued partial 
cooperation through bilateral agreements among the EU members and the MED countries with a 
failure to achieve sustainable development; 2) the Euro-Mediterranean as one global player scenario 
where common EU-MED frameworks of action on key topics including trade are set. In this case 
sustainability is achieved via common targets and strategies; 3) the EU and the MED as regional 
players on the global stage is a scenario where multilateral agreements between the EU and the MED 
countries are undertaken to enhance cooperation on key topics. In this case the sustainability is 
achieved with separate pathways; and 4) the Euro-Mediterranean area is under threat is a scenario 
where weakening and failure of cooperation schemes lead to possible disruption of EU institutions 
with the rising of regional conflicts in the MED area and certainly sustainability is not achieved. In 
fact, such scenarios coincide with the analysis undertaken in this study, yet not in a complete way. For 
example the reference scenario of MEDPRO is similar to the optimistic scenario in which only 
abolishment of tariffs takes place (shallow integration). In this case the gains from trade in terms of 
higher exports and imports between EU and MED countries or between MED countries are not high. 
The second and third scenarios dealing with the Euro-Mediterranean as one global player and the EU 
and the MED as regional players on the global stage are similar to the optimistic scenario concerning 
deep integration where trade gains are likely to be high, especially if NTMs are abolished and 
logistics-related problems are solved. The improvement of logistics seems to have a significant impact 
on trade creation and thus should be given due attention from a policy-making perspective. The fourth 
scenario of the Euro-Mediterranean area is under threat is similar to the pessimistic scenario in which 
piecemeal measures (insignificant reductions or increases in tariffs as well as NTMs) are not likely to 
enhance (or reduce) trade in a significant manner, whether between EU and MED countries or 
amongst MED countries themselves.  
Annex 2. NTMs in the MED countries affecting their trade in the Euromed area, and how 
the EU can help21 
Despite significant efforts undertaken to tackle NTMs in the MED countries, still there is a room for 
further actions to enhance trade between MED countries and the EU, as well as amongst MED 
countries. This short review provides an overview of the efforts undertaken in the MED countries to 
combat NTMs and the remaining problems that require further actions, where the EU can provide 
help. We identify the NTMs related to standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs 
procedures, intellectual property rights, competition, and government procurement issues.  
Regarding standards, MED countries have undertaken several steps to harmonise their national 
standards with the international ones and with those of the EU. MED countries are at different stages 
in terms of harmonising their standards with the EU, but all have been progressing in an impressive 
manner. All MED countries which have been engaged with the EU in Association Agreements have 
made progress to negotiate an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial 
Products (ACAA). Despite the significant developments undertaken by MED countries in this regard, 
there is still a lack of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) signed between MED countries and the 
EU or amongst themselves, with the exception of Israel (which has such an agreement with the EU). 
This situation reflects the absence of trust in the standards' procedures adopted in MED countries or 
the weak accreditation of domestic organisations, which have not been granted international 
                                                     
21This part is based on Ahmed F. Ghoneim (2009), “Analysis of NTBs in Euro-Med Zone”, in Luc De Wulf and 
Maryla Maliszewska (eds), Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, CASE Network Report 
No. 89/2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526992. 
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recognition yet. In other words, there is a lack of credible comprehensive conformity assessment22 
systems that allow trust in the standards' systems in MED countries. A major dimension of the 
conformity assessment problem is associated with the lack of investments in related infrastructure, 
including laboratories and necessary equipment. This situation could be improved with technical and 
financial assistance from the EU so as to give greater confidence on the conformity assessment 
systems.  
Despite the progress made by the MED countries to harmonise their standards with international 
norms, several problems remain open, namely:  
• Labelling and packaging requirements for a wide array of imported goods seem to be the major 
NTMs identified in all MED countries, as reported by the US in USTR reports or by the EU in 
different databases (market access databases). The specific labelling and packaging measures are 
strict when dealing with some items including foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and textiles. Such 
measures result in increasing costs for exporters to MED countries including Egypt, Israel, 
Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. Available information confirms that such measures also impeded 
intraregional trade among MED countries themselves in the context of the Agadir agreement.  
• Testing procedures at the borders differ depending on product and its sensitivity and between 
individual MED countries. The testing procedures often lack uniformity and transparency.  
• Inadequately staffed and poorly equipped laboratories often yield faulty test results and cause 
lengthy delays.  
• Application of market surveillance systems which in most countries, except for Israel and, to a 
lesser extent, Jordan, is still in its infancy. 
• The flexibility identified in choosing among different international standards, as in the case of 
Israel and Egypt, is not fully implemented, which creates a much scope for uncertainty among 
exporters to those countries. In Tunisia there is huge complexity for the application of import 
technical regulations, which negatively affects the clearance of goods from customs and has a 
negative effect on the competitiveness of Tunisian firms.  
As in the case of standards, MED countries have been working on providing flexibility and 
harmonising their SPS measures with international norms. For example, in Egypt, a program was 
completed to identify mandatory and optional requirements in each new product standard. The new 
standards follow CODEX guidelines for safety and the protection of human health. A new National 
Food Safety Authority is expected to be established in the near future following the American model 
of FDA. The majority of Jordans announced SPS regulations are WTO-consistent. Moreover, the 
Jordan Food and Drug Administration (JFDA) has applied a risk-based system for the inspection of 
imported food consignments. The JFDA also applies a risk-based assessment for domestic produced 
products. Other MED countries have undertaken similar measures to those adopted in Egypt and 
Jordan. 
Despite the efforts in SPS aspects there are a number of general problems that affect exporters to MED 
countries though they differ in their degrees of urgency, as follows: 
• The issue of shelf-life and the ad hoc application of shelf life procedures for imported products is a 
major concern for food product exporters to MED countries. Jordan has undertaken positive 
developments in this regard and has replaced the shelf life system with “best before”. 
                                                     
22 Conformity assessment is the name given to the processes that are used to demonstrate that a product 
(tangible) or a service or a management system or body meets specified requirements. Conformity assessment 
can cover testing, surveillance, inspection, auditing, certification, registration, and accreditation. See 
http://www.iso.org/iso/resources/conformity_assessment/what_is_conformity_assessment.htm. 
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• Special religious requirements as in the case of Halal meat and Kosher regulations cause several 
complications for specific food stuff exporters to MED countries regarding the procedures and 
certification requirements.  
• There are also a number of specific products that have been subject to SPS measures applied by 
MED countries on imports from the EU. For example bans on importation of live birds, their meat 
and products have been applied by Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Israel.  
• Moreover, there are a number of SPS measures that are country-specific with no clear scientific 
basis, which are often cumbersome to fulfil.  
• MED countries face major problems in accessing each other’s markets due to the multiplicity of 
systems and documentation required in each country. Lack of transparency on SPS requirements 
and vague application has resulted in denial of market access for intra-Agadir exports, where 
imposition of ad hoc fees or simply denial of market access for a wide array of agricultural and 
processed food products has been the case.  
• Moreover, it is not clear to what extent national treatment is applied regarding SPS measures. 
Several incidents of non-compliance with international rules (e.g. Codex) are reported on the 
borders with no clear information on whether the same treatment is applied to domestically 
produced goods. 
• Exporters from MED countries face high compliance costs associated with EU SPS standards, 
certificates, and measures as HACCP, EUREPGAP, and BRC. Though complying with such 
measures provides exporters with access to the EU markets, small producers and exporters have a 
difficult time to satisfy all these requirements. The traceability system has certainly added extra 
compliance costs for exporters from MED countries to EU. All such additional costs when 
combined with EU agricultural production and export subsidies and erosion of preferences for 
MED countries due to the proliferation of EU regional trade agreements undermine the 
competitiveness of MED countries' exports to the EU market.  
As for customs procedures, we observe that all MED countries have undertaken significant 
developments by including automated systems and reducing the number of procedures and steps 
needed for customs clearance. Yet, as in the case of standards and SPS measures, several NTMs still 
prevail. EU support is needed in this area to ensure that deep integration materialises, especially in the 
following areas: 
• Streamlining customs procedures for intra-MED country trade would boost such trade that is still 
below its apparent potential. This might require establishing a monitoring mechanism to ensure 
compliance of MED countries with customs valuation. The EU could also use its influence to 
persuade MED countries to eliminate extra charges and surcharges imposed on intra-MED trade, 
especially in the context of Agadir agreement. 
• Ensuring proper adoption of post-clearance audit, which does not seem to be applied by all MED 
countries, and even when applied by some of them such as Jordan, indicates that the process is still 
in its infancy. 
• Provide assistance to correctly implement the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. 
• Assist with putting effective post-clearance audit capacity in place, including training to improve 
technical procedures and capacity-building. This could greatly contribute to the faster release of 
imports.  
In the field of intellectual property rights (IPRs), all MED countries have adopted legislation that is in 
compliance with TRIPS. However, all MED countries have problems with the enforcement of IPR 
laws and regulations and/or weak provisions in some of their legislation that at times make them non-
compliant with TRIPS. The reports of main trading partners (US and EU) indicate there are some 
loopholes in the laws. Moreover, not all MED countries have adhered to TRIPS-plus type international 
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agreements to which most of the EU countries have signed up. The EU could assist MED countries in 
reducing the circulation and trafficking of counterfeit/pirated goods and improve their compliance 
with TRIPS. This could involve: 
• Providing technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of MED countries to monitor violations 
of TRIPS provisions, and enhance their enforcement capabilities, including upgrading of courts 
and judges responsible for handling TRIPS related cases, while ensuring that strengthening such 
measures will not have negative repercussions for the social situation of MED countries, such as 
increasing prices of medicines or basic educational copyright products.  
• Providing technical assistance to ensure compatibility with TRIPS in areas where MED countries 
still adopt non-compliance measures. For example, the review of the US and EU reports identified 
that some MED countries still have loopholes in their national laws regarding their conformity 
with TRIPS including, for example, pharmaceuticals data in Israel, and patents and trademarks in 
Jordan. EU assistance in amending national laws is certainly needed; especially given that foreign 
assistance in this field has been dominated so far by the US. 
• Initiating or improving cooperation between the various national bodies in MED countries 
responsible for IPR enforcement. Such initiatives can be undertaken in a regional context as 
problems faced by individual countries in fighting counterfeit and pirated goods are similar. 
In areas related to competition and government procurement, it is worth noting that MED countries are 
not very advanced. For example, the competition legislation in most MED countries is new and 
weakly applied, whereas the issue of liberalisation of government procurement is still in its infancy. In 
this regard, what is needed from the EU is technical assistance to upgrade the institutions responsible 
for such issues, without emphasis on the need for harmonisation with EU norms and regulations.  
In fostering greater competition the EU could support MED countries through: 
• Seek an agreed definition of state aid that takes into account the differences in economic 
development, social and political structures between the MED countries and the EU. For example, 
the flexibility regarding block exemptions for regulations currently adopted by the European 
Commission should be extended to MED countries and could cover issues such as basic education, 
mass transportation, and other areas of concern to MED countries.  
• Enhance the capacity-building of competition authorities in MED countries and the information 
databases they can use to ensure the effective implementation of competition laws and regulations 
(in terms of data, human capital, and means of fast and accurate investigations). 
• Ensure that de minimis regulation applied by the EU fits the developmental considerations of 
MED countries. Such agreement would enhance the chances of compliance.  
• Introduce new forms of cooperation (positive and negative comity agreements among EU and 
MED countries competition authorities). 
• Ensure that there is progress made by MED countries to implement the competition-related 
articles in the Association Agreements. 
• Investigate new potential for cooperation among sectoral regulators between the EU and MED 
countries and among MED countries themselves. 
• Finally, among the areas that do not appear extensively in the EU documents (action plans and 
progress reports) and that should receive more attention is the cooperation among sectoral 
regulators in areas such as public utilities and telecommunications. In this regard cooperation in 
terms of twinning projects (currently some of them are already in place) could be expanded. The 
main emphasis here could be on the transfer of EU knowledge and expertise in managing such 
sectors (e.g. electricity, water, and telecommunications) to MED countries.  
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In the area of government procurement, the EU can help as follows: 
• An alternative to reaching a regional agreement with respect to government procurement would be 
to aim at sectoral and bilateral agreements between the EU and the MED countries. This could 
take into account the sensitivity of some sectors in particular countries.  
• Transparency could be enhanced by clarifying the criteria for using exceptions to open tenders; 
defining a time limit to take procurement decisions.  
• The EU could strive to obtain the same rights as granted to American firms under the different 
FTAs, memoranda of understanding, and offset agreements in their trade negotiations with MED 
countries. 
This review of NTMs prevailing between EU and MED countries identified main areas for 
intervention and support by the EU to MED countries. The nature of support differs where in some 
cases technical and financial assistance is much needed to strengthen the capacity of MED countries, 
as in the area of standards and SPS measures. Areas of standards and SPS measures require more 
technical and financial assistance to upgrade the level of conformity assessment procedures and 
infrastructure. This will enable MRAs to be concluded and hence will enhance the market access of 
MED countries' products in the EU with a higher degree of trust.  
In some areas there is a need of EU assistance to enhance south-south trade among MED countries. 
The assistance can take the shape of ensuring that MED countries comply with policies and 
regulations that are in line with their WTO obligations or EU Association Agreements when trading 
with each other. The EU can assist by helping MED countries establish some monitoring mechanisms 
for NTMs affecting their intra-regional trade.  
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Annex 3. Description of Mediterranean trade and protection database 
Annex 3 intends to serve as a reference source for the trade and protection database. This annex 
presents and details the major variables in the database by explaining the source and the main 
assumptions considered at the time of construction. 
Trade data 
Trade data comes from the UN Comtrade database. The database reports, in its standard form, exports 
and imports at HS 6 digit level. Since this classification is standard to all countries, it is possible to 
make comparisons between products in different countries. The data reported in this database has been 
aggregated into HS 2 digits or chapter level. 
The database only considered bilateral exports and imports reported by each of the 10 Mediterranean 
countries analysed within them and to the 27 countries of the European Union.  
The Harmonised System started to be implemented gradually in 1988. This implies that it is 
impossible to get trade data under a common classification system before that year. However, the 
implementation has been slow and the earliest data at the required classification do not go beyond 
1990. However, this data was not available for all countries. Excluding Syria, the earliest year with 
trade data for all reporters is 1997. Table 13 presents the value of trade by country and year and it also 
shows the trade data availability. 
Table 13. Exports in millions of US dollars by reporter and year 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,282.08 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,028.72 8,846.66 
1992 7,935.94 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,328.36 9,490.64 
1993 6,697.47 0 0 0 0 2,587.56 0 3,164.79 9,256.79 
1994 5,932.48 2,035.03 0 277.39 0 2,775.28 0 3,779.27 10,600.00 
1995 6,374.89 2,061.50 5,705.01 337.04 0 3,180.62 0 4,501.80 13,700.00 
1996 7,209.84 2,332.93 6,209.50 0 0 3,144.67 0 4,472.00 14,100.00 
1997 9,359.25 2,280.27 6,560.21 315.00 283.46 3,002.53 0 4,478.75 15,000.00 
1998 6,616.73 1,668.84 7,010.37 265.33 293.86 5,307.12 0 4,658.99 16,900.00 
1999 8,850.42 1,745.80 8,801.29 391.38 301.46 5,789.73 0 5,116.08 18,100.00 
2000 15,500.00 2,526.22 9,745.43 337.16 283.28 5,839.48 0 5,101.80 17,900.00 
2001 13,700.00 1,883.22 8,694.45 400.48 344.25 5,443.05 4,121.21 5,779.58 20,300.00 
2002 13,600.00 1,863.61 8,373.26 576.92 390.00 6,056.62 5,055.82 5,994.22 23,100.00 
2003 16,300.00 2,810.17 9,652.72 496.09 452.89 6,956.31 4,566.66 7,140.09 31,100.00 
2004 19,600.00 3,938.74 11,900.00 627.40 598.43 7,683.65 3,797.89 8,737.91 41,400.00 
2005 28,300.00 4,863.42 13,600.00 737.50 697.45 8,592.13 4,998.13 9,349.31 47,100.00 
2006 31,600.00 6,082.10 14,100.00 829.34 718.80 9,585.65 6,497.30 10,100.00 54,500.00 
2007 29,400.00 6,573.20 13,500.00 999.85 1,029.47 11,000.00 7,713.47 13,500.00 68,100.00 
2008 46,400.00 13,300.00 19,400.00 1,281.30 1,263.19 12,800.00 0 15,900.00 73,900.00 
2009 26,500.00 0 13,800.00 1,076.30 0 9,819.95 0 12,500.00 58,800.00 
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Gravity variables 
Typical gravity variables come from the CEPII gravity database. This dataset includes several 
variables to measure different issues that explain trade between countries such as distance, common 
language, legal system, etc. It also includes mass variables such as GDP and population. We have 
supplemented these mass variables by including the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) GDP (different definitions) and population.  
Tariff data 
Tariff data comes from UNCTAD Trains database. The data was extracted a HS 2 digits in order to 
make it compatible with the trade database. Table 14 presents the average MFN tariff applied by 
country and year. It also shows the tariff data availability. Three different types of tariffs are provided 
by TRAINS: 
• MFN (Most Favourable Nation) tariff. It is the standard, non-discriminatory tariff applied to any 
WTO member. It is, in general, the highest tariff applied to any WTO member.  
• AHS (Effectively applied tariff): If preferential tariffs exist for a pair reporter-partner, TRAINS 
reports as the effectively applied tariffs as the lower of the two. Therefore, the AHS is the 
minimum between the preferential (if it is available) and the MFN tariff.  
• PRF (Preferential tariff): It is the tariff applied in a bilateral agreement. It is generally lower than 
the MFN tariffs. 
It is important to remark that the tariffs reported by TRAINS are compositional. This implies that in 
calculations (averages, standard deviations, etc.) only tariff lines where imports are available were 
considered. Therefore the average tariff at 2 HS digits, for example, only considers those tariffs where 
trade flows are available.  
Table 14. Mean MFN tariff applied by country and year 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey 
1990                            
1991                            
1992                   29.58             
1993    23.44               67.05          9.41  
1994                            
1995     28.36                31.19    10.07  
1996                            
1997    25.78               23.60          9.84  
1998    25.01    24.53                31.98             
1999               13.05          11.73  
2000             25.82        19.58       34.84                 
2001    23.14            18.48          9.42       35.07                 
2002    20.52    45.88          18.04          8.33       34.09    14.92      36.72             
2003    19.78            16.31         33.30        32.19      8.51  
2004     35.82     7.19            8.19          32.25             
2005    20.39    31.12     7.31        17.11          8.38       30.48        31.35      8.46  
2006    20.40       7.08        14.67          8.35       27.90        31.78      7.27  
2007    20.18       6.59        14.56          7.34       26.27          9.08  
2008    20.36    29.40     6.69           24.04          8.29  
2009    20.19               20.79          9.31  
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Non-tariff  measures 
By definition, a non-tariff measure (NTM) is any other measure that does not adopt the form of a tax 
on the value or quantity imported. This constitutes a major problem to quantify and analyse this type 
of measure. NTMs can take a very wide range of forms; from sanitary measures (requirement of 
certificates) to price control measures. The final effect is to restrict imports by making trade operations 
costly and cumbersome.  
NTMs can be applied to the whole range of products regardless of their origin. Typical types of 
measure are product labelling requirements with its origin or that of the agents involved in any trade 
operation must be registered in the imported country. This type of measure, in principle, has the effect 
of reducing a general level of imports. However, their effects tend to be minimal. 
Specific products may be also subjected to NTMs regardless of the origin. This type of measure 
addresses some risks or potential dangers associated with the trade of a particular product. Typical 
examples are the sanitary requirements to be met in order to import food products such as certificates, 
quarantines, mandatory inspections, etc. However, this type of measure is very effective to control the 
inflow of particular type of products that could be in competition with local producers. Therefore, it is 
often argued that true health concerns are used to disguise market protection measures. 
NTMs, on the other hand, can be applied to specific products and specific origins. This type of 
measures is used when a risk has been identified in a particular origin for a particular product. For 
example, bans of imports of chilled or frozen beef from countries with outbreaks of food and mouth 
disease. Also, they are applied when a disloyal practice is suspected or identified in a particular origin 
for a particular product. In this case, antidumping duties or retaliation measures are applied to correct 
this distortion. The trade distortion effect of such a measure is very high and it is applied both to 
address true concerns and with the intention to protect the domestic market from competitive 
suppliers. 
NTMs could be applied to a particular country in respect to all products. These measures are forbidden 
by the WTO given its discriminatory nature, but they have been applied in the past during sensitive 
political situations. The example is a trade embargo.  
Finally, the effect of NTMs is not limited to the main parties involved. Third countries may be 
affected by the introduction of restrictions on a competitor, for example. In this case, trade will be 
diverted away from the NTBs affected country towards the country not affected by the measure. 
Therefore, it is convenient also to analyse if NTBs have been applied to other partners. 
As we have seen, NTMs can take a wide variety of forms. TRAINS have an extensive list of all type 
of either tariff or para-tariffs measures applied. Its codification assigns a 4-digit code to each measure. 
However, it is possible to distinguish eight groups of them: 
1. Tariffs. All types of tariff and taxes applied exclusively to imported products. MFN and 
preferential tariffs are included in this group but also special tariffs levied due to safeguards or 
retaliation. 
2. Different types of charges and taxes applied to finance specific services such as inspections or 
statistical services. It also includes taxes applied to goods, regardless of their origin (either 
domestic or imported) such as general sales tax. 
3. Administered prices. All types of measures are included here that affect the price at which the 
product is imported. Within this category, it is possible to find price controls, minimum import 
price requirements, price undertaking, etc. Some safeguards and antidumping duties are applied 
through this channel. 
4. Financial measures. These are measures that affect the finances of import operations. Among these 
types of measures it is possible to find refundable deposits to be made before the operation or 
advance payments of custom duties. It is possible to find some restrictions on the operation of 
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foreign exchange, such as multiple exchange rates, and restrictions on the operation in foreign 
currency.  
5. Automatic licenses: Licenses are administrative procedures that require the submission of an 
application or other document (besides those required for custom purposes) as a prior condition for 
the importation of goods. When the license is granted automatically, the required administrative 
procedure fulfils some non-protection objective, such as statistical data collection. The approval of 
the application is granted in all cases. It also includes, without restricting imports, surveillance of 
some sensitive products (chemicals, food, etc.). 
6. Non-automatic licenses and other quantitative restrictions: when licenses are non-automatic, some 
government body must authorise the operation. This licenses or permits are required to control the 
trade on very sensitive and dangerous products (arms, potentially dangerous chemicals, etc.). 
However, non-automatic licenses could act as a protection measure that makes imports operation 
subject to discretion and risk. 
Quotas and other types of quantitative restrictions are included in this group. Quotas basically 
limit the amount of a particular product to be imported. It may adopt the form of a tariff rate quota, 
where a determined amount of good is subject to a given rate but any additional quantity is taxed 
at a higher (frequently prohibitive rate).  
In this group it is also possible to find other types of administered trade such as agreements 
between countries to restrict or control the movement of some products such as the Multifibre 
agreement or voluntary export restraint agreements. Finally, products that are prohibited in the 
importing country, such as alcoholic beverages, are included in this group. 
7. Monopolistic measures: in this group it is possible to find measures that try to preserve some 
monopolistic power in the importing country. Typical here are operations that must be performed 
by government trading companies or agencies. Also, it is possible to find products that must be 
imported through single channels, either public or private. Moreover, requirements for using or 
contracting national services such as transport or insurance in the import operation are typical in 
this group and may increase the price of the imported good. 
8. Technical or quality regulations: these are measures aimed to assure some minimum level of 
quality of the product or that the imported product meets the same specification as the domestic 
product. In general, these measures are implemented in order to satisfy the domestic technical 
regulations by the imported products. Regulations on packaging and labelling (including quality 
assurance in product information) belong to this group.  
Sometimes, products are also required to pass some technical tests to see if they meet the domestic 
regulations.  
These types of measures can be also used to protect domestic production. Labelling requirements 
may preclude the possibility of using some description because the domestic regulations are not 
met. Countries may have, for example, different criteria to establish the amount of cocoa that a 
chocolate bar may contain in order to be labelled as ‘chocolate’.  
We have considered these eight types of measures separately in the database by distinguishing the 
scope of the measure (general measures, product-specific, and country product specific). Within each 
chapter we present the number of measures for each type applied. The number of measures applied 
may be a poor proxy of the effectiveness of a NTM. A single measure could be sufficient to stop 
imports, making the rest of the measures redundant. However, it is very hard to measure the 
effectiveness of a single NTM. Since we are considering aggregated data, chapters with a higher 
number of measures applied will reveal some intention to control the flow of this type of products. 
Therefore, the measure chosen may be a good approximation to the restrictions in place.  
Finally, we have also reported the number of measures by type applied to third countries not included 
in the database, since it could be a very interesting variable to analyse. 
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Unfortunately, it was not possible to find series of NTMs applied. It was possible to identify only one 
year of data available for each country. The NTMs data are included in the database in the 
corresponding year. 
Database key 
Reporter: 3-letter code for the reporter. Only Mediterranean countries were considered as reporters. 
Partner: 3-letter code for the partner. Partners are considered for each of the 10 Mediterranean 
countries plus the 27 EU countries. 
Product: 2 digits HS heading. 
Val000M. Imports declared by reporters in thousands of USD dollars imported from partner 
Val000X. Exports declared by reporters in thousands of USD dollars exported to partners. 
CEPII gravity database 
Contig. It takes value 1 if the pair reporter-partner shares a common border. 
Comlang_off. It takes value 1 if the pair reporter-partner shares a common official language. 
Comlag_ethno: It takes value 1 if the pair reporter-partner shares a language spoken by at least 9% of 
the population. 
Comcol: It takes values 1 if the pair reporter-partner had a common coloniser before 1945 (Algeria and 
Tunisia, for example). 
Distw: This is the weighted distance. It is the distance between the main cities of both reporter and 
partner weighted by the share of each city in total country population. 
Pop_o: Origin (reporter) country population in mn. Source: CEPII 
Gdp_o: Origin (reporter) current GDP in mn in USD. Source: CEPII 
Gdpcap_o: Origin (reporter) current GDP per capita in USD. Source: CEPII 
Area_o: Origin (reporter) area in square kilometres. 
Pop_d: Destination (partner) country population in mn. Source: CEPII 
Gdp_d: Destination (partner) current GDP in mn in USD. Source: CEPII 
Gdpcap_d: Destination (partner) current GDP per capita in USD. Source: CEPII 
Area_d: Destination (partner) area in square kilometres. 
Tdiff: Number of hour difference between reporter and partner 
Heg_d: Destination (partner) is current of former hegemon of origin (reporter) 
Conflict: Takes value one if war 
Indepdate: Independence date if colony variable==1 
Heg_o: Origin (reporter) is current of former hegemon of destination (partner) 
Col_to: takes 1 for trade from heg_o to colony 
Col_fr: takes 1 for trade from colony to heg_d 
Colony: takes 1 for pair ever in colonial relationship 
Curcol: takes 1 for pair currently in colonial relationship 
Empire: Indicates the empire reporter used to be part 
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Gatt_o: takes 1 if origin (reporter) is GATT/WTO member 
Gatt_d: takes 1 if destination (partner) is GATT/WTO member 
Rta: takes 1 if a regional trade agreement exists between reporter and partner 
Leg_o: Indicates the legal regime in the origin (reporter) 
Leg_d: Indicates the legal regime in the destination (partner) 
Comleg: Indicates if the reporter and partner share the legal regime 
Comrelig: Indicates if the reporter and partner share the religion 
Entry_cost_o: Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) in the origin (reporter) 
Entry_tp_o: Days and procedures to start a business in the origin (reporter) 
Entry_cost_d: Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) in the destination (partner) 
Entry_tp_d: Days and procedures to start a business in the destination (partner) 
Comcur: If partner and reporter have a common currency 
Gsp: If the partner grants GSP preference to reporter 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database 
GDPcnst2000_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP in constant 2000 USD. Source: WDI 
GDPPPP05_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP in purchasing power parity 2005 USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurr_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP in current USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurrPPP_o: Origin’s (reporter) GDP PPP current in USD: Source: WDI 
Population_o: Origin’s (reporter) population. Source: WDI 
GDPcnst2000_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP in constant 2000 USD. Source: WDI 
GDPPPP05_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP in purchasing power parity 2005 USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurr_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP in current USD. Source: WDI 
GDPcurrPPP_d: Destination’s (partner) GDP PPP current in USD: Source: WDI 
Population_d: Destination’s (partner) population. Source: WDI 
Trains Tariffs database 
Tar_savgAHS: Origin’s Effectively applied simple average tariff 
Tar_wavgAHS: Origin’s Effectively applied weighted average tariff 
Tar_sdAHS: Standard Deviation of the effectively applied tariff in the origin country 
Tar_minAHS: Minimum effectively applied tariff in the origin country 
Tar_maxAHS: Maximum effectively applied tariffs in the origin country 
Tar_nbrlinesAHS: Number of lines in the chapter in the origin country 
Tar_intlpeakAHS: Effectively applied tariff number of International Peaks in the origin country 
Tar_savgMFN: Origin’s MFN applied simple average tariff 
Tar_wavgMFN: Origin’s MFN applied weighted average tariff 
Tar_sdMFN: Standard Deviation of the MFN tariff in the origin country 
Tar_minMFN: Minimum MFN tariff in the origin country 
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Tar_maxMFN: Maximum MFN tariffs in the origin country 
Tar_nbrlinesMFN: Number of lines in the chapter in the origin country 
Tar_intlpeakMFN: Effectively MFN number of International Peaks in the origin country 
Tar_savgPRF: Origin’s preferential applied simple average tariff 
Tar_wavgPRF: Origin’s preferential applied weighted average tariff 
Tar_sdPRF: Standard Deviation of the preferential tariff in the origin country 
Tar_minPRF: Minimum preferential tariff in the origin country 
Tar_maxPRF: Maximum preferential tariffs in the origin country 
Tar_nbrlinesPRF: Number of lines in the chapter in the origin country 
Tar_intlpeakPRF: Effectively preferential number of International Peaks in the origin country 
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